# K—Racial IR—FMPS

This is similar to the imperialism K put out by the BFHR lab, but focuses more on the racialized epistemologies and motivations behind IR scholarship than on the external imperial outcomes of policy, and has a much more framework/scholarship-focused alternative. That said, the evidence between the two Ks very much overlaps, so you can use that file to supplement this one and vice versa.

This file was made possible entirely by the work of Cleo Shaw!

### K---1NC

#### IR scholarship is founded on racial omission.

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

The field of IR is grappling with renewed calls to reform its longstanding elision of race, manifested most recently in Foreign Policy(Bhambra et al. 2020, Shilliam 2020a, Zvobgo & Loken2020) and Foreign Affairs(Blain 2020). These interventions have since been complemented by various public speaker series, webinars, and discussion forums, each retrieving important contributions that criticize IR scholarship as silent on race. Those that expose and contest this silence aptly describe it as particularly tenacious in mainstream IR, especially research that appears in the discipline’s top journals. While new efforts are being made to take race seriously, such as Búzás’s(2021) piece in the 75th anniversary special issue of International Organization and the special issue calls on race by Security Studies and Security Dialogue, IR scholars are still coming to terms with a discipline that is historically reluctant to address questions of race. The notion that IR is colorblind has long been interrogated. Seminal critiques of this notion, of which the norm against noticing is a contemporary interpretation, lay bare the centrality of race and racism in the making of an intellectual and professional discipline. The mythology of a colorblind tradition in American IR was rendered explicit by early disciplinary work on the role of White supremacy in world making. To the forebears of this critique, what was often taken to be race neutral was, in practice, silence and evasion about the African presence in world politics. As Krishna (2001) explains, race constitutes a crucial epistemic silence around which modern IR is continuously made and coheres. For Krishna, contemporary IR discourse is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, an abstraction from the role of racialized violence in the construction of nation-states and the system they inhabit. As the discipline developed, the timeless problems of anarchy and the security dilemma came to define the core questions of IR in line with Cold War imperatives, making race irrelevant for many scholars. Relations between states, where material power and national interest shape behavior, were assumed to occur above the supposedly domestic issue of race. Intellectual commitment to the assumption of anarchy in world politics, however, was coterminous with the discipline’s willful amnesia about race. Indeed, while implicitly equating anarchy with the primitive, and equating the resulting state of nature with supposedly violent peoples outside Europe, scholars stripped anarchy of any notion of race and racism (Sampson 2002). For some, the norm against noticing reflects a common difficulty in accepting the idea that the “international” in international relations was imagined along the color line (Vitalis 2015).For critical theorists, forgetting race cannot be reduced to discomfort, disinterest, or unaware-ness among scholars (Sabaratnam 2020). By implication, the invisibility of race in IR was not accidental but designed. Similar observations have been made about the makeup of the IR as mostly White and male, an institutionalized feature that produces and reproduces itself (Doty1993; Henderson 2007, 2013; Lake 2016; Rutazibwa 2020). That which was made most visible in IR—its distinguishing intuitions and methodologies—is also that which conceals race, denying the possibility of its explanatory power.

#### Mobilizing NATO to save the planet is a racialized project that gets operationalized to inflict violence on the Other.

**Platon 15**(Mircea Alexandru, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, History ““PROTRACTED CONFLICT” The Foreign Policy Research Institute “Defense Intellectuals” and Their Cold War Struggle with Race and Human Rights”, CS) Marked for ableist language

The FPRI literature produced by Possony, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and their constant collaborators argued that the only way to defend White Western Civilization against Communist “Oriental despotism” was the development out of a military confederation such as NATO of an Atlantic Union— a political confederation under American hegemony, and, as Possony argued as early as 1949, the creation of a world police (Possony 1949 , 1953 ). This institutional structure would allow “Western democracies” a virtual monopoly on technology, natural resources, and violence. As a Cold Warrior impatient with the “verbal magic” of the empty legal formulas of international organizations and agreements, Possony maintained that there was no other way to maintain peace than war and the increase of the capacity to wage war, defined as “the purge of the enemies of the new order” (1949, pp. 294-295). For Strausz-Hupé, the United States was “the most powerful nation of European stock” (1945, p. 108), a fact of enormous importance according to the theories of Third Reich geopolitician Michael Hess, quoted by Strausz-Hupé. Hess argued that only the “white race”—through its mastery of technology—was “truly ‘space-bridging,’” the other races being of the space-bound variety (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 91). That meant that both the geographical position and its technological prowess designated the United States as the main “arsenal” of an “international police force,” and as the master of the “nucleus” of great powers that would control the balance and the stability of the “new and universal order” after the defeat of the Axis powers (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 194-195). Quoting Karl Haushofer’s judgment that the United States “possessed all the geopolitical prerequisites” for achieving global hegemony, Strausz-Hupé warned that Haushofer had hoped that the Americans would eventually fail in their bid for world supremacy because they were “race-biologically ~~retarded”~~ and torn apart by internal racial tensions (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , pp. 66-67). The keen interest manifested by Strausz-Hupé, Possony, and Kintner for the role played by “race” during the Cold War seems to betray their fear that Haushofer was right and that lack of racial homogeneity would indeed compromise the U.S. bid for global leadership (Glaser and Possony, 1979 ). It is indeed difficult to understand Strausz-Hupé’s work without taking into consideration the way in which Nazi geopolitical theories informed his racialized approach to the Cold War (Crampton and Tuathaila, 1996 ; Raffestin et al., 1995 ). Nazi Geopolitik—with its concept of a dynamic frontier and perpetual international instability fostered by the dynamic of growing, expanding versus shrinking, and dying, states—was interpreted by Strausz-Hupé in terms of an opposition between the stable, “civilized order” of Europe and “the Asiatic aversion to fixed boundaries” (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 220). Europeans, Strausz-Hupé argued, could not be reasonably expected to forget the “pungent meaning of Asia” (1942, p. 91). Strausz-Hupé discovered some sense even in Hitler’s frenzied attacks on “Asiatic bolshevism” and warned that, since the history of Russia bore the mark of the Mongols and since Russia had inherited the role of Asian oppressor of Europe, the Cold War was merely another stage of the eternal clash of “men of the steppe against the man of the sown; the mounted horde against the dwellers of the city; mass against form” (1952, p. 82). These premises allowed FPRI intellectuals to defend both the legacy of old-fashioned European colonialism and new-fangled American imperialism by denouncing any anti-colonial movement or non-aligned state as an “Asiatic,” unruly, “primitive” threat against the “real,” civilized, democratic “New Order” dominated by the United States (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 196). The United States led the Free World in a global struggle for the “preservation of the Western Community” (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 3). Since this struggle was a psychomachia, a clashing of spiritual worlds, StrauszHupé rejected any “optimistic idea” about a meeting of the cultures and argued that only a “whole,” “unitary,” and pure Western culture could hope to successfully meet the challenge of the East. According to Strausz-Hupé, one of the ways in which the West could transform the “discrete whole” of European culture into a world culture was to abandon the antiquated and ultimately petty cult of national heroes and promote instead the “heroes of its common undertakings,” the conquerors and colonizers who were the true global heralds of the West: “The exploits of Cortes, Pizzaro, Clive, Stanley, Bugeaud, Lyautey, Rhodes, Muraviev were conquests on an Asiatic scale” (1952, pp. 7-8, 12-13). Western colonial expansion indicated a thriving Western culture (although the West was supposed to be at the same time essentially static, a victim of Asiatic restlessness). In order to defend this way of life, America had to vigorously embrace military, economic, and cultural imperialism, a benign form of imperialism whose weapons were not merely “military force or political coercion,” but also “anti-imperialist” discourses (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 294). It also had to create an Atlantic Union and increase spending on propaganda in order to advance the vertical and horizontal integration of Western culture, that is to discourage the multiplication of people with lower IQ levels and to encourage the adoption of the same Weberian pro-capitalist Protestant values by the entire “Free World.” The creation of an Atlantic Union would be both the result and the safeguard of these efforts.

#### The impact is a self-fulfilling prophecy---actors perceive other nations as more threatening, fueling escalatory actions.

**Búzás 12**(Zoltán I, Associate Professor at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, “Race and International Politics: How Racial Prejudice Can Shape Discord and Cooperation among Great Powers”, CS)

Identity influences foreign policy behavior in several ways. It may serve as an ideological device to justify self-interested policies, it may influence the cost of policy options, it may restrict the menu of possible foreign policies, or it may provide foreign policy preferences.244 My approach is closest to the latter two. Identities influence action by narrowing the menu of foreign policy options and by giving actors “primary reasons for action” or providing them with “motivational and behavioral dispositions.”245 I link racial identities to behavior through a relaxed version of the “logic of habit.” 246 Once activated, racial prejudices embedded in racial identities shape threat perceptions and create behavioral dispositions habitually and relatively automatically. All else equal, racial identity shapes patterns of discord and cooperation as follows. Through the lens of their racial identity agents perceive racial others as more threatening, which facilitates discord and impedes cooperation. In turn, agents perceive those with shared racial identity as less threatening, which facilitates cooperation and impedes discord. In this view, “structures of identity that yield systematically biased perceptions” sustain enduring patterns of conflict and cooperation.247 The endurance of these behavioral patterns is supported by the self-fulfilling nature of prejudices. The perceiver acts unconsciously on prejudices, which elicits prejudice-consistent behavior from target agents, validating prejudices and reinforcing their impact on the behavior of the prejudiced agent.248 Although a relaxed logic of habit does not obviate the role of agency, rationality, and uncertainty, it reduces their significance. Agents may refuse to act on a particular prejudice if they recognize it as such, but since most of the time prejudices work unconsciously or are not recognized as prejudices, agents tend to act on them. States may still rationally calculate what their best options are. However, their agency will be constrained and rationality “bounded” as states will consider and act on a menu of foreign policy options limited by racial prejudices. This relaxed logic of habit does not exclude the logic of consequences where actors are driven by cost-benefit calculations, but it sets the parameters within which this latter can operate. Uncertainty plays a role in initial stages of threat assessment, but once racial prejudices are activated, they dissipate uncertainty by imposing a false certainty on threats. The process through which difference in racial identity predisposes agents towards discord is similar to that through which “misplaced certainty” facilitates conflict.249 In the absence of significant threats decision makers may nonetheless be certain that they perceive threats. This can give rise to a series of escalatory actions and reactions which can facilitate conflict.

#### The alternative is an epistemic rejection---refusing the attempt to racialize the international should start right here.

**Gani and Marshal** **22**(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)

Given the historical and ongoing mutual complicity between knowledge producers and policy-makers in upholding imperial and racial orders, we now consider the responsibilities, possibilities and challenges faced in altering the nature of that nexus. Doing so requires turning to what Danso and Aning call an ‘episteme of alternativity’;41 and the primary way for academics to enact this would be to draw on anti-colonial practice and legacies, rather than imperial competition, as the foundation of their theorizing. Thus, in his article, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh forefronts global South policy-makers and focuses on the nuclear order (a topic that is typically associated with realist IR) to demonstrate how it can be approached through an alternative, critical epistemology.42 Disrupting the ‘Great Power gaze’, Mpofu-Walsh asks what the politics of non-proliferation looks like from the perspective of the global South, especially the African continent as the sole nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). There, denuclearization is fundamentally linked to decolonization. Thus anti-colonial goals, rather than hegemonic/imperialist competition, are at the root of both policy and theorizing. How different would IR knowledge and theories on nuclear weapons be if African praxis and the importance of NWFZs were taken seriously? Turning to the Middle East, Gani similarly argues in her article that the inclusion of non-western history and voices—from policy-makers to activists and scholars—in think-tank discussions can mitigate the latent colonialism that shapes western policy.43 Nevertheless, even with an incorporation of non-western practice and knowledge in policy making and scholarly theorizing, multiple perspectives that are marginalized even in the local context, owing to class or gender, may continue challenge such patterns is by adopting a more expansive reading of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and indeed ‘practice’. In doing so, we can dismantle some of the constructed and false hierarchies between elite ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ on one hand, and local ‘tradition’ on the other.45 The former is assumed to be objective, reliable and associated with western (and western-validated) universities; while the latter is viewed as subjective, unscientific and commonly associated with Indigenous, racialized, grassroots communities. Assumptions about who counts as a true knowledge producer or ‘expert’ is not only elitist but heavily racialized and gendered. Definitions of who counts as a ‘practitioner’ are equally narrow, so that scholars or policy-makers may place much weight on the views and actions of state, global governance and corporate practitioners, but do not view as equal practitioners those involved in everyday practice in their communities—those who in fact sustain their ecology, livelihoods, security and identities, all while having to navigate the impact of top-down policies.46 Both the articles by Jan Wilkens and Alvine Datchoua-Tirvaudey on climate justice, and by Althea Rivas and Mariam Safi on the organizing and practices of Afghan women, share knowledge from non-elite local communities and challenge the above binaries and hierarchies. In their article on climate justice in the Arctic and the Mediterranean, Wilkens and Datchoua-Tirvaudey explain that academic– practitioner knowledge exchange has often been a contributing factor in continued climate injustice.47 The existing patterns of this knowledge exchange on climate governance are dependent on hierarchies of knowledge, namely, the valorization of western/‘scientific’ knowledge production at the expense of the needs and knowledges of the Indigenous and local communities most affected by climate change (i.e. the community-based practitioners, rather than the institutional/state ones). Moreover, the spaces where such knowledge exchange takes place are often exclusionary (in who is invited, in the parameters of discourse and/or in the extortionate costs of participating), producing an intra-elite debate.48 Having identified these racialized patterns, they offer a corrective decolonial strategy for ethical climate governance, founded on practice-based knowledge and diverse ways of knowing that bring in those excluded insights. The article by Rivas and Safi also provides an example of how the academic– practitioner nexus can be ‘decolonized’, one in which everyday knowledges of Afghan women, in all their diversity and complexity, are centred in peacebuilding efforts.49 Their article, co-written by an academic and a local practitioner, offers a methodology of how to take into account the internal hierarchies of positionality, interests and knowledges that are always present when engaging with grassroots communities for the sake of ‘research’. Rivas and Safi also demonstrate the importance of registering and valuing the unlooked-for, atypical knowledges from below, such as the subtle observations offered by Afghan women in rural areas that, contrary to wider assumptions, reflect their political engagement and interest. Caution against extractivism in the search for such local knowledge exchange is at the forefront of both the above contributions.50 Thus academics should remain reflexive in what the purpose of their research is, and who really benefits. Moreover, a praxis of decolonizing such research necessarily entails taking time in a way that is at odds with the current culture of speedy and multitudinous productivity in academia: the rapid churning out of articles from ‘the field’ should raise appropriate questions about how, why and for whom that research is being conducted.

## Links

### Link---China

#### Images of a violent Chinese Rise enforce a racialized narrative with a Western-centric model.

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

Power shifts. As Reus-Smit (2017) notes, challenges to prevailing regimes of cultural stratification become most pronounced in the face of shifting material balances of power. Racial prejudice, after all, is activated by perceived competition with subordinate racial others in order to maintain the status quo hierarchy (Bobo 1999). Racialized threat perceptions, in other words, can have the most palpable effects on world politics under the condition of major power shifts. In conjunction with their newfound material capabilities, rising but racially subordinate states can trigger racialized fears and foreign policy aggression from declining but racially dominant states. As Adler-Nissen& Zarakol (2021) point out, the current challenge to the liberal international order partly comes from rising non-Western powers such as China who seek to redress their grievances against what they perceive to be a Western-centric, and thus White-dominant, global order. Historically, Japan’s revisionist foreign policy in the early 1930s has also been explained as motivated in large part by the rising power’s frustration with the then more explicitly racialized Western-dominated inter-national order (Ward 2013). Dominant powers simultaneously tend to perceive such challenges with a racial lens, giving rise to racialized foreign policy narratives, most famously exemplified by the still popular “Yellow Peril” discourse (Búzás 2013, Ward 2013). Perceived racial affinity, on the contrary, appears to substantially ameliorate fears and uncertainty under power shifts, again as suggested by the fin de siècle Anglo–American rapprochement (Vucetic 2011a,b; Edelstein 2017).Future research should investigate whether racial fears inflate threats from a rising China, produce public support for hawkish policies, and potentially aggravate military tensions. More studies are needed, for example, on the extent to which contemporary public opinion on China is racialized, how top-down anti-China rhetoric can activate racial fears, and the potential mechanisms by which racial prejudice affects actual policy making and crisis management (see Miller &Taylor 2017; Dionne 2020; Han & Marwecki 2020; Kim 2020, 2021; Ebner & Medenica 2021). In parallel, researchers can pay more attention to how a rising China produces and manages its own racialized narratives as it promulgates the discourse of the century of humiliation by the West.

### Link---Climate

#### Their invocation of ecological catastrophe furthers racial violence by narratively cohering it within a linear temporality of progress.

Agathangelou, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Politics, York University (Anna, “On the question of time, racial capitalism, and the planetary,” Globalizations, 18:6, 880-897, dml) [brackets in original]

Physicists, spiritual leaders, and theorists argue ‘time is not real’ (Martin, 2020; Rovelli, 2018). It is a ‘human construct … to help us differentiate between now and our perception of the past’ (Martin, 2020). As a meaning that human groups have given to change (Tabboni, 2001), it organizes our systems of thought and our everyday lives. Time has special meaning in politics, where ‘the very distinction between truth and fiction has been made redundant’ so that ‘the criterion is no longer accuracy – it’s conformity to the needs of the moment’ (Klein, 2014; emphasis added). Our present analytical and political challenge is to grapple with the ways time is entangled with the ‘needs of the moment’ in areas of energy and climate change. Yet the politics of the ecological require understanding time. Notions like succession, simultaneity, duration, urgency, waiting, speed, geological revolutions, money, and death are expressions of time and are entangled with the ecological and its models of development.

The increasing risks to the environment as a result of the extraction of conventional oil and natural gas resources and the increased greenhouse emissions have led to what the experts have called the climate crisis. Yet as Klein says, ‘despite being convinced of the necessity of addressing our behavior as regards energy consumption, collective consciousness appears at once paralyzed and indecisive … frozen in the face of the obstacle’ (Klein, 2014). Instead of frozen time, Bourriaud points to the acceleration of time and what this has wrought: ‘the great acceleration also lies within the process of the naturalization of capitalism: now it has become both organic and universal, it is the natural law of the Anthropocene’ (cited in Chiambaretta, 2017). Mbembe (2021) expands this argument of the relations of time with the planetary by arguing the politics and aesthetics of the ecological require understanding the coloniality of power and its contemporary temporal mutations. Imperial expansion, Mbembe argues, was (is) a planetary project driven by nationalist states and companies to reallocate the earth’s resources through military might and privatization. Colonial epistemes and practices of time block the potentiality and affirmation of a planetary beyond capture and conquest (Marriott, 2011) but national decolonization cannot be ‘what gives deep breathing for the world’ (Mbembe, 2021). Some physicists speak of ‘eternity in relation to time’, wherein ‘atoms and the emptiness of the universe are infinite, uncreated, and imperishable’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 435). Others speak of chronological and cyclical time, attributing the first to the West and the latter to the East. Newton (1643–1727) defined time as a mathematical variable with one dimension. The only two ‘topological objects with this characteristic’ are a ‘line and a circle … . It thus follows that time is either infinite or cyclic’ (Oestreicher, 2012, p. 436). Grappling with the question of social death, Frank Wilderson argues that assembling black life into a series of historical events, into a narrative with a plot ‘is a catastrophe for narrative at a meta-level rather than a crisis or aporia within a particular narrative’ (Wilderson, 2015b). For him,

narrative time … marks stasis and change within a [human] paradigm, [but] it does not mark the time of the [human] paradigm, the time of time itself, the time by which the slave’s dramatic clock is set. For the slave, historical ‘time’ is not possible. (Wilderson, 2010, p. 339)

In this article I engage with two dominant logics1 and grammars of time,2 modernity, capitalism, and ecology: time as linear, flowing in a particular direction (determined sequencing separable in measurable units), and time as retrojection, defined as ‘a kind of projection that retrospectively testifies to ‘what comes before’’ (Walker, 2012, p. 268) or after.3 Examining how these two ideas of time become central to the co-production of the planetary as a colonial and imperial project will allow a structural engagement with the emergence and generation of the conditions for decolonial planetary relations as acts of invention (Fanon, 1967; Marriott, 2014).

A Caribbean slave proverb, ‘time is longer dan rope’, challenges the dominant notion of linear time and progress. The state and corporations continue to expropriate black lives and indigenous lands, thus ‘extract[ing] surplus from various processes of social and ecological reproduction’ (McGee & Greiner, 2020), including the obliteration of lives. These structures of death are taken for granted, including the colonial linear structures of progress and growth, their contingent epistemic edifices and the privileges that shape and enable social and ecological reproduction.

Generally speaking, temporal boundaries are drawn to render climate change or ecological crisis theorizable within certain fields, such as environmental, governance, and conservation studies. However, that which is ‘inside’ or embodies a temporal trajectory connotes what is present in the economy, while the ‘outside’ connotes a void (without time). Rather than seeing contemporary readers as always irrevocably distanced from such events, if those who write on climate change focus the language of time, they may open up new possibilities for bringing to the fore substantial structures whose temporality or lived experience is occluded or does not even register as time. In fact, the pervasive tapestries of violence and their temporal structures are challenged by theorists of black thought, indigenous studies, postcolonialism, and Fanonian studies (Rifkin 2017; Wilderson 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Fanon, 1967). They challenge historical and linear time, orienting the reader toward a reality that is neither graspable nor conquerable but a flickering reality of sensed and unsensed ‘actualities, the moment under the moment’ (Hoban, 1992). They problematize easy readings of structures and dominant systems of thought and their entanglement with notions of time, and they query the collective amnesia of temporal productions and the racial capitalist-enslaving-colonial global order where, on the one hand, things are written on water and evaporate (Shafak, 2014, p. 2) and, on the other, certain ecologies and lives are dead on arrival.

Modernist nationalist and capitalist iterations of time focus on linear teleologies/eschatologies. This orientation of the temporal operates through causality, stories of progress and growth, the plausible and possible, and ideas about movement from past to present to future and evolution (Wilk, 2007). However, another orientation, retrojection, I argue, is vital to racial ecological capitalism’s dominant power. Without engaging with both of these structures and operation of time simultaneously, we cannot understand power and its entanglements with the planetary. The temporality of capital’s projection retrospectively testifies to what comes before its current organizing. Retrojection requires us to ‘relocate ourselves into the past’, while ‘assigning purposes and ends to [such] actions’ (Motzkin, 1992) as well as a mythical agency to capital. These two expressions of temporality co-exist, at times in tension. They are inflected in our institutions and our social life.

In this piece, I look at the structure of time and ecology to trace how social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences draw on such structures to colonize, enslave, and imperialize the planetary. I trace how and when time and temporality bound the Anthropocene. The search is not for a start date but for the ways the ‘date’ or the ‘when’ is a political, economic, scientific, and ethical question (Davis & Todd, 2017, p. 761; Rifkin 2017; Whyte, 2017; Saldanha, 2020) entangled with the structure of time and what Fanon calls the invention or new beginning beyond global capital’s projects. I draw on a 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and work by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway to register the co-production of the temporal with ‘the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason … policy [and] culture, values, subjectivity, emotions and politics’ (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 12).4 I use these works as a springboard for thinking how this temporal co-production expresses the tension between the reproduction of capital and the generation of life. To conclude the piece, in conversation with Octavia E. Butler, I suggest instead of dreading an impending crisis, we should read radically for the ruptures in the dominant structures of time (i.e. in narratives, dialectics, etc.) (Marriott, 2011; Wilderson, 2010) and their entanglement with questions of the planetary and climate change. Such fractal readings may yield insights into possible disinvestment from the fossil economy and open up the possibility for an indeterminate world, the passionate and living experimenting with and harnessing of the flux of energy into a vision of a decolonial whose basic premise is not conquest and enslavement.

Liberalism: always too late, or capitalism’s colonial and enslaving proactivity?

In the IPCC reports, time as a linear human orientation is placed in the context of timescales of forces requiring human intervention but out of human control: climate change. The recent SRl.5 (IPCC, 2018), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’, representing the ‘newer instalment of the scientisation of climate change’, situates ‘the issue beyond democratic debate by declaring it a matter for the scientific expertise of the IPCC’, and inscribes it as an emergency (Garrard, 2020, p. 1). The report suggests ‘climate change is moving faster than we are’ (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018, p. v), and its urgency demands our intervention. However, the moral and ethical articulation of the climate as a linear temporal ‘urgency’ does not allow us to understand ecological shifts or even climate change in a larger trajectory, including human conquest, property relations, and competition. Rather, the report’s ‘foreshortened timeframe’ speaks to the urgent need of global concerted efforts to mitigate climate change and signals how temporary responses and procrastination are not going to do the trick (Garrard, 2020, p. 2).

John Mecklin, Editor of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, similarly reminds us that time is running out:

Faced with this daunting threat landscape and a new willingness of political leaders to reject the negotiations and institutions that can protect civilization over the long term, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board today moves the Doomsday Clock 20 s closer to midnight - closer to apocalypse than ever. (Mecklin, 2020)

The moving of the clock makes the ‘climate emergency’ public, especially for those proponents of liberalism whose ‘macroscopic exclusion clauses’ have been written to ‘displace … unfreedom’ onto all marginalized, enslaved, and colonized peoples and those ‘primitive’ and ‘undeveloped’ sites ‘from a white male bourgeois European who was the historical agent in the narrative’ (Mann, 2019). Yet this moving of the clock does not address the root of the problem. It allows the positing of a secular/humanist eschatological story (Rothe, 2020, p. 162) whose temporal structure is one of immanent destruction, informed by an analysis of existence as being-towards-death (i.e. of the human and the planet) or catastrophe.

Of course, this schematic presumes death and ecological catastrophe (collapsed into one). It represents a never-reached horizon of experience, where authentic and moral decisions must be made through a theory or ‘concept of crisis or emergency’ (Mann, 2019). Liberal leaders of the international political system ‘inch toward’ an implementation of a regulatory system, what Mann and Wainwright call climate Leviathan, instead of addressing the root causes of global warming. These leaders are not creative but ‘fumble … for solutions’, continuing to argue that ‘climate change’ is a ‘market failure, without considering the limiting structures of the ‘market’ itself (Osaka, 2019, p. 2; citing Mann & Wainwright, 2018). When the moment for organized challenge emerges, white hegemony rushes to squander the creative energy and reorients social relations toward its consolidation. It does so by rushing to innovate through the co-production of narratives and an emerging ecological order.

The present as a fracture of notions of history and ‘historical natures’

Apocalypse is ‘the single most powerful master metaphor that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal’ (Buell, 1995, p. 285). As such, it deranges capital and its entanglements with ecological problems, ranging from the climate change, to the extinction of species, the loss of pollinating insects, and other ecological disasters. These challenges or this ecology of environmental concerns cannot be considered in a partitioned manner.

The focus on temporality has been picked up by historians and others grappling with what the authors of the Anthropocene name a crisis and emergency. One text that speaks to the global climate change as apocalyptic temporality is Oreskes and Conway’s The Collapse of Western Civilization. In theorizing the present and the temporal possibilities for the future otherwise, these authors open the door for us to experiment with what Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun call sociotechnical imaginaries (2013). The book’s narrator is a Chinese historian in the year 2393. The historian says Western civilization possessed robust information about climate change and the ‘damaging events to unfold’ but was ‘unable to stop’ them (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, p. x, pp. 1-2), thus ‘condemning their successors to the inundation and desertification of the late twenty-first and twentysecond centuries’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. 59–60). A second Dark Age descended, and the Period of Penumbra began. The present ignorance, the historian says, is a result of an ‘ideological fixation on ‘free’ markets; another compartmentalization and the practice among the scientific community of demanding an excessively stringent standard for accepting claims of any kind, even those involving imminent threats’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2014, pp. ix-x). In a sense, this future scenario tells nothing about the future and more about the ‘present’ – our moment.

However, the narrator’s historical account is problematic and, as Garrard argues ‘unequivocably dangerous’, as the scenario focuses on ‘catastrophic outcomes’ (Garrard, 2020, p. 3). Gallard’s critique is important to our discussion of temporality. Narrating the present as a given history evades uncertainty and possibilities for the world as a project beyond global capital. In a sense, this dystopian temporality posits itself as the ‘truth’ of our reality as if punctuating a certain kind of imaginary temporal orientation – the only one about the future. This depicted history anticipates the failure of the future by drawing on assembled empirics and technologies of problem-solving as if failure and the future are not up for debate (Jasanoff, 2019), as if the historical codes and genre choices that assemble these dystopia future scenarios are not ‘originary’ to the familiar narratives of history which they ground.

In highlighting that the Anthropocene is actually a ‘liberal managerial term’, Mann (2019) suggests the ideology of liberalism distorts the multiple social reproductions of violence and strategies of failure by sublimating them through temporal means, deploying concepts such as crises, emergencies, and exceptions, and substituting adaptation for progress. We see this in scientific reports, for example, the SRl.5 and others; while they address the metabolic rifts and shifts, they still use the Anthropocene as the social contract (Mann, 2019). In Climate Leviathan, Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann argue crisis, risk, and uncertainty are asymmetrical, the result of the actions of a minority of humanity, i.e. the white male bourgeois European who claims the agency and writing of the historical narrative of liberalism and imperial capitalism. The Anthropocene is a technology co-productive of temporal regimes of modernity and the planetary order:

[The Anthropocene is] an explicitly future facing instrument of temporal power. Like all contracts, it restarts time on its terms. The distribution of responsibilities it represents is always also the closure of supersession of past arrangements. So, a contract that has no expiration, like a constitution or the Anthropocene, is supposed to mark the end of the past and the beginning of a new time. (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 8)

The Anthropocene is itself a technology of temporal power which orders and organizes social life. In questioning this contract, Mann and Wainwright problematize how time is used to organize global power. They question whether the idea that the Anthropocene marks the end of the past as many claim and the beginning of a new time is accurate. For them, this fetishization of the Anthropocene evades the intensifying challenges to the world. The structure of ‘transition’ of the contemporary global order and the production of history of liberalism as progress (Mann & Wainwright, 2018, p. 9) are problematic and do not acknowledge how such kinds of politics are co-produced with a structure of transcendental time as their major procedural technology of governance. The transformation of the world’s political economy and the fundamental political arrangements most people take for granted thus need to be engaged on the register of the language of temporal power and the global order.

### Link---Democracy

#### The affirmatives claims that democracy creates peace ignore the colonial violence democracies perpetuate and valorize the sovereign state in order to justify an unquestionable Western authority

**Del Negro 20**(Justin, third-year student pursuing a dual degree in International Relations at Western University and Business Administration at Ivey Business School, “Confronting the Racist Roots of International Relations”, CS)

In 1944, Karl Polanyi described the nineteenth century world as [“the Hundred Years’ Peace,”](https://www.amazon.ca/Great-Transformation-Political-Economic-Origins/dp/080705643X) a dictum that has become the [dominant characterization](https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/stable/40645028?pq-origsite=summon&seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents) of this period in global affairs. It is true that conflict between the six or even twelve prominent Western powers [declined notably](https://www.academia.edu/1053370/The_Myth_of_the_Hundred_Years_Peace_War_in_the_Nineteenth_Century) when compared to previous or later centuries. However, considering conquests against weaker states and colonial wars against non-state actors produces approximately [88.11 years of war](https://www.academia.edu/1053370/The_Myth_of_the_Hundred_Years_Peace_War_in_the_Nineteenth_Century) in which major powers were involved. Britain was almost [perpetually absorbed in conflict](https://www.academia.edu/1053370/The_Myth_of_the_Hundred_Years_Peace_War_in_the_Nineteenth_Century) during this period – either via territorial expansion or suppressing violent colonial uprisings. The Indian Revolt of 1857 alone resulted in over [6,000 British casualties and left around 800,000 Indians dead](https://books.google.ca/books?id=dyQuAgAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y) due to the violence and resulting famine. How can such consistent conflict occur during a period supposedly marked for its enduring peace? In international relations discourse, war is almost [exclusively defined](https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/stable/40645028?pq-origsite=summon&seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents) as an act between “sovereign powers.” Violent acts on any political entity other than a “state” (i.e. native territories, proto-states, warlords, etc.), or those committed *by* political entities other than a “state”, such as the British East India Company, are conveniently removed from the purview of *international* relations. This abstraction instantly sanitizes a violent world history, committed overwhelmingly against non-whites, that the modern international order is built upon. The distortionary impact of such a model is exemplified by the widely popular democratic peace theory, which proposes that democracies are less likely to engage in war than non-democracies. This proposition is [historically inaccurate](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066107076951) if one simply includes a democracy’s colonial conflicts, and yet democratic peace theory has been [continually invoked](https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/09/the-implicit-imperialism-of-democratic-peace/) by Western leaders during the invasion of Iraq and in other occupations of non-democratic, non-white countries. The valorization of the sovereign state, which [emerged in unison with imperial conflict](https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/stable/pdf/40645028.pdf), serves to privilege the Western model in international affairs and justify colonial and neo-colonial violence today. Both liberalism and realism, the dominant paradigms of contemporary international relations, operate from a conception of global anarchy which in many ways enforces the hierarchical racial dualism associated with early international relations theory. International relations’ conception of anarchy [is based](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2012.710585) in the Hobbesian state of nature, which is presumed to occur in the absence of the state. However, Hobbes’ only real-life example of those in the state of nature can be found in [“the savage people in many places of America.”](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2012.710585) Implicit in this analysis is the belief that while civilized democratic states established international order among themselves, the undesirable condition of anarchy was found in the backwards, non-white areas, which relied upon civilized people to impose order for them. Sampson argues that underlying the definition of anarchy is a trope of African primitivism, a [“tropical anarchy,”](https://go-gale-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&hitCount=1&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA96124494&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CA96124494&searchId=R1&userGroupName=lond95336&inPS=true) developed by British anthropologists in the 1930s and 1940s which imagines a decentralized, depersonalized and uncivilized society. This representation of international politics inserts an implicit theoretical narrative which assumes racist and [anthropologically obsolete binaries](https://go-gale-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&hitCount=1&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA96124494&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CA96124494&searchId=R1&userGroupName=lond95336&inPS=true) of a primitivism and civility, suggesting that only civilized Western powers have the authority to initiate meaningful change at the international level. The inability of international relations as an academic field to confront its Eurocentric, colonial biases makes it unfit to provide an accurate understanding of the modern state system. Just as racism impacted colonial policies abroad and domestic attitudes towards imperialism, anti-Japanese racism [influenced](https://www.jstor.org/stable/969251?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) American engagement in World War II, and domestic racism has [long impacted](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/racism-ir-international-relations-domestic/) America’s willingness to adopt a leadership role in promoting international human rights. Race has and continues to [influence perceptions of both domestic and international threats](https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa034), which shapes innumerable international decisions. The wave of white nationalism and Islamophobia across Europe in response to the Syrian refugee crisis is a testament to the modern impact of racism on foreign policy. To evolve past its harmful Eurocentric biases, international relations must abandon its colonial-era precepts and formally integrate the critical role of race within its theoretical framework.

### Link---Econ/Trade

#### Economic concerns get used to create a global racialized divide, enforcing colonialism in the labor regime

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

Foreign economic policy. The effects of race and racism can also be found in foreign economic policy. Critical race scholarship in IR has long pointed out the enduring legacies of colonialism as manifested, for instance, in the global labor regime. Immigrant laborers continue to be subject to the racialized practices of labor exploitation (Persaud 2001). Racialized global inequality also permeates other domains such as North–South trade relations and aid regimes. Rosenberg (2019)provides systematic evidence of how racism affects global migration flows, showing that migrants from majority-Black states migrate significantly less than they would under a racially blind hypothetical scenario. Focusing on the role of more subtle forms of modern-day racism, Singh (2017)shows that the global North continues to offer unfavorable trade terms to the global South. Scholars have also placed racism at the center of the global aid regimes, finding that paternalism (Baker2015, Baker & Prather 2021) and racial resentment (Simon & Moltz 2019) play a large role in garnering public support for foreign aid. One particularly promising area of research centers on the increasing racialization of international trade, engaging conventional theories of trade policy preference in international political economy. Utilizing survey experiments and multiyear public opinion surveys, a group of scholars finds that the racial identity of a potential trading partner has become increasingly important for American public support for overseas trade, often at the cost of the respondent’s material self-interest. These recent studies find that such racial considerations are most prominent among White Americans who have become far more protectionist than other racial groups in the country (Guisinger 2017). Supported by evidence from multiple surveys, Mutz et al. (2020) point to higher levels of racial prejudice among Whites as one potential source of the growing race gap in trade attitudes. As the United States comes closer to becoming a “majority-minority” nation, future research might further investigate the sources and political consequences of the race gap in trade and other foreign policy issues.

### Link---Fem

#### Feminist IR approaches center themselves on the views of the white Western woman---reafffirming Eurocentric ideas rather than challenging them

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit 20**(Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Melanie, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory, “Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School”, CS)

First, feminist scholars of securitization theory have questioned whether the theory can account for gender relations (Hansen, 2000; Heck and Schlag, 2013; Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004; H. Hudson, 2005; N. F. Hudson, 2009; Kearns, 2017). Much of this research is inspired by Hansen’s (2000) widely cited article that argues that classic securitization theory’s limitations regarding gender are methodological: speech act theory cannot account for the gendered power dynamics that underpin situations when speech is not possible. Hansen illustrates these methodological shortcomings through the fable of the Little Mermaid, wittily locating the analysis in Copenhagen, then abruptly travels to Pakistan and Bosnia for empirical evidence. There, Hansen (2000: 299) finds ‘honour killings’ and ‘raped Muslim women’ who are deemed to be silent. This Orientalist imaginary constructs a racial opposition: white Western women, who have achieved legitimacy as vocal political actors, versus ‘silent’ subaltern women (Abu-Lughod, 2002; on securitization theory, see Bertrand, 2018). This elides gendered insecurity in places like Denmark, where ‘gender equality’ is often figured in white supremacist discourses as a mark of civilization threatened, for instance, by Muslimified (Richter-Montpetit, 2014: 45) immigrants. So, in core feminist securitization theory texts, we find that Eurocentric and racist thought is reaffirmed rather than challenged. Second, securitization theory’s Eurocentrism has been challenged by scholarship that asks whether applying securitization theory to the non-West upends or modifies the theory (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), a question echoed by some of securitization theory’s original proponents (see Greenwood and Wæver, 2013). However, securitization theory has never ignored the ‘non-West’. As we will show, it draws heavily on racist accounts of spaces outside Europe that reify a stark division between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ without examining colonial relationalities. Critics of securitization theory’s Eurocentrism assert that we cannot assume a (functioning, democratic) European state in non-West spaces, but ignore the (settler-)colonial underpinnings of the state system and border cartographies. Seeing the issue solely as the analytical exclusion of the ‘non-West’, they decry ‘Eurocentrism’ while retaining racist political thought. We adopt a more robust analysis (see Sabaratnam, 2013) that views Eurocentrism as involving the ideas that: (1) ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ is ontologically distinctive; (2) European development was endogenous; and (3) European cultural and political achievements were subsequently diffused across the world. Additionally, we deploy concepts beyond Eurocentrism (civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism) to grapple with the role of racist political thought in securitization theory.

### Link---Hegemony

#### Notions of US leadership further racialized governance and interventions.

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

Although engagement varies across the movement of critical race theories and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), much of the work within these reconstructive traditions has sought to uncover the ongoing dynamics of racialized power that constitute international law and relations. The racialization of international law can be seen in several contemporary legal and political trends that are at least implicitly premised on a conception of non-White-majority countries as being deficient and in need of assistance or corrective action by North American or European states. Good governance. The program of good governance and its strategic promotion in the non-European world illustrates this point. A term that gained considerable prominence in the field during the 1990s, good governance became a way of organizing, interpreting, and deploying legal doctrines in international politics. While norms entrepreneurs in various international and non-governmental organizations herald the concept as an advance in international law, critics note that it bears an old lineage of racialized dispossession. Influential development institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as human rights groups, promote standards of governance that are seen as already perfected in the European world. On the other hand, non-White-majority societies are imagined in perpetual lack of the good governance needed for stability and progress. Countries that lack good governance, thus, are understood as lacking some quality implicitly assigned to White countries. According to Anghie (2006), good governance was invoked to create non-European governments that would facilitate European commercial expansion. Grovogui (1996) similarly explicates international law as “outside administration” by a West that seeks to maintain its imperial holdings long after its withdrawal. Status of Forces Agreements. Extraterritoriality in US Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) betrays similar assumptions about state capacity and governance. SOFAs establish when and how the domestic laws of host governments are applied to US military personnel stationed in those countries (Yeo 2014, Efrat 2022). While these agreements stop short of immunizing US troops against criminal sanctions, SOFAs effectively constrain the legal authority host countries exercise over US forces. At their core, SOFAs attempt to reconcile US interest in safeguarding soldiers’ rights with deeply held beliefs about the inferiority of non-European institutions and courts (Freeman 2021).Foreign basing contracts like SOFAs—a bargained concept of hierarchy—are not beyond prevailing symbols of subordination that reinforce pathologies of colonial legal regimes (Cooley 2017,Allen et al. 2020). The notion that non-Europeans lack “government suited to the white man” has long been embraced as “just cause” for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and in some cases, capitulation(Grovogui 1996, p. 51). A hallmark of Western foreign policy, extraterritoriality declares a kind of state of emergency where normal rules do not apply (Ruskola 2008). Variation in US SOFA jurisdiction conveys a similar story. The United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly European host states, allowing these peer countries to try US personnel while withholding this same right from most non-European host partners, ceteris pribus (Freeman 2021). Since immunity relies on the premise of inherent difference between peoples and societies (Cassel 2011), it affirms prevailing beliefs about racial difference. Thus, hierarchical conceptions of race are reified through extraterritorial jurisdiction and its codification into the SOFA Responsibility to Protect. Unanimously endorsed at the UN World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) represents a collective commitment to atrocity prevention. Viewing authorized intervention as responsibility constitutes a departure from the norm of nonintervention established in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and incorporated into the UN Char-ter. R2P engenders and reproduces international hierarchy through its normative diminution of sovereignty (Getachew 2019a). Integral to this process is the recasting of sovereignty as responsibility, a concept that invents the conditions for intervention in ways that are racially biased. Notwithstanding the African origins of R2P, often cited to thwart charges of neo-imperialism, the doctrine of responsibility appeals to the paternal protection common in colonial philosophy. To be sure, the shadow of racial hierarchy in international law is long. From the Berlin Treaty, which “enshrined the responsibility of Europe in watching over and improving the conditions of native populations” (Gathii 1998, p. 202; emphasis original), to the League of Nations settlement, which excluded those lowest in the race hierarchy from its international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system), racism and the rhetoric of responsibility are constitutive of the principle and need for intervention (Gathii 1998, Grovogui 1996). R2P is no exception. The principle renders sovereignty conditional upon the evaluations of international institutions (like the UN Security Council) that are empowered to decide when a state has failed to fulfill its responsibility (Getachew2019a). At its core, R2P reflects the same projection of deficiency onto non-White countries, promoting the idea that countries lack either the will or the capacity to treat their domestic populations equitably and fairly. The fruit of this alleged failure of responsibility is the near-exclusive application of R2P toward African states

### Link---Humanitarian Aid

#### Humanitarian intervention is intrinsically racialized---it promotes a white savior complex that locks non-whites into supposed origins.

**Lynch 19**(Cecilia, Professor in the department of political science at the University of California, Irvine, “The moral aporia of race in international relations”, CS)

This humanitarian order brings together western and transnationalized publics with states and U.N. agencies to create new forms of ‘partnership’ (one of the new buzzwords for implementing post-Cold War moral codes).68 In these relationships, nongovernmental organizations are delegated to give ‘early warning’ of conflict, and provide aid in sites of suffering. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and the International Criminal Court, new components of the IR/IP architecture, provide post-Cold War justifications for varying degrees of military intervention.69 These interventions privilege interference in Africa and Asia while overlooking crimes against humanity committed by countries such as the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to critics.70 Economic intervention occurs in the form of humanitarian and development aid by a complex of nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and state donor agencies. Such aid has become ‘neoliberalized’ into a kind of Foucauldian governmentality, in which nongovernmental humanitarian organizations work hand-in-glove with state and UN agencies to provide assistance according to market logics. These logics promote interventions that seek (albeit often unsuccessfully) to obtain quick results for limited investment of time and money,71 in the process inscribing racialized victimhood on populations of the global south. Humanitarian government highlights violence to non-white bodies, but does so in ways that erase white/northern responsibility for the fragility of political and economic structures within the global south. These interventions inherit and continue the racialized phantasms of earlier interventions in Congo and Biafra, among numerous others. Cilas Kemedjio, for example, argues that the moral discourses of nongovernmental groups who wanted to aid starving Biafrans in the late 1960s established the foundation for contemporary military interventionism in the present. Kemedjio highlights in particular, the racialization of late-colonial and postcolonial moral codes that seek to save non-white bodies from themselves and their environments.72 Although realists and liberals debate the degree to which state interests should limit or foster intervention in societies riven by violence, critics show how the ‘humanitarian international’ established and perpetuates a ‘white saviour industrial complex’ that has the effect, in both IP and IR, of once again locking ‘non-whites … in[to] their supposed origins’.73

### Link---Revisionism

#### Their notions of a perceived revisionist get operationalized to enforce a new, violent understanding of international politics

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

The recent worldwide surge in anti-Asian hate at the height of the pandemic calls for renewed attention on how race and racism connect to international politics. Fueled by inflammatory elite rhetoric, deep-seated racial animus has far-reaching implications for not only domestic racial relations but also interstate, and most importantly, great power relations (Dionne 2020; Kim 2020,2021; Reny & Barreto 2020). As we shall see, race and racism can affect the way foreign threats are perceived, competing visions of national interest are deliberated, and foreign policy responses are selected. Having elucidated international law as a projection of racial deficiency, we now turn to the second face of racism, namely the perception of racial others as potential threats. Notions of deficiency and hostility, though seemingly contradictory, straddle a key feature of racial hierarchy. Subordinate racial groups are considered not only inferior but potentially threatening to the status quo. Dominant actors within a racialized international order, in other words, perceive racial others as a latent threat to their own interests, and by extension, their identity. Racial hierarchy thus directly conditions how state actors interpret the behavior of racial others, assess their own interests, and cope with felt challenges to their status. Understanding this element of racial hierarchy can help us reexamine the overlooked role of race and racism in shaping a wide range of foreign policy preferences and decision making. In the language of Reus-Smit (2017, p. 879), though he avoids explicit reference to race, an international order is a configuration of political authority in which the need for legitimacy requires complex heterogeneity to be converted into authorized forms of cultural—including racial—difference. Racial hierarchy, by extension, provides a key source of legitimacy for an unequal global order, engendering “intersubjective understandings about...the appropriateness of its constituent role identities” (Reus-Smit 2017, p. 879). Under such prevailing “diversity regimes,” subordinate groups are perceived as a latent existential threat with potentially revisionist intent and incompatible interests. Sociological and psychological understandings of racial hierarchy also suggest that it is through the effect of racial prejudice that dominant groups evaluate threats from racial others and formulate their behavioral responses. Building on Blumer’s (1958) group position theory of prejudice, Bobo (1999) posits that racial prejudice involves more than negative feelings or stereotypes and instead derives more fundamentally from a felt challenge to the sense of relative group position. The long tradition of social dominance theory also attributes the source of racial prejudice and violence to the human predisposition to maintain group-based social hierarchies(Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Conceived in this way, racism is related to but goes beyond social identity theory, which posits an innate human tendency toward in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner 1979). By socializing state actors into constituent identities and interests, racial hierarchy turns attention away from simple out-group tensions to threats to group status and, thus, shows how racism can play a deeper role in shaping perceived foreign threats, national interest, and ultimately foreign policy behaviors.

### Link---Securitization

#### Their securitization narrative perpetuates the idea of the “West and the Rest”, non-Eurocentric civilizations are viewed as primitive, justifying the violent assertion of U.S. leadership

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit 20**(Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Melanie, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory, “Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School”, CS)

Securitization theory similarly occludes the racial violence of normal (liberal) politics. This is not just a conceptual problem: it results in major empirical oversights. For example, though it contains the word ‘security’, securitization theory places social security outside of its frame of analysis, as part of ‘normal politics’: ‘Although it shares some qualities with “social security,” or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning. Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Securitization theory overlooks the power politics of social security and cannot see how Western welfare state social security systems support white (settler) heteropatriarchal forms of life, such as the nuclear family (Arvin et al., 2013; Cohen, 1997; Duggan, 2003; Kandaswamy, 2008), and disproportionately target racialized, indigenous, and poor communities for direct and violent interventions such as the removal of children from families through enslavement, the residential schools that formed part of the genocide of indigenous people, child welfare systems, migrant detention and removal, and so on. Closer to Copenhagen: Denmark now uses socialized daycare as a means for removing and assimilating Muslim children (Salem, 2018). Social and national security are imbricated. For example, current Islamophobic counter-terrorism programs often use social and health services to identify suspected ‘terrorists’ (Kundnani, 2014; Qurashi, 2018; Qureshi, 2015). Social security only entails ‘entitlement and social justice’ for those privileged by whiteness, heterosexuality, citizenship, and/or class status. Securitization theory’s civilizationist idealization of ‘normal politics’ occludes these dynamics. More strikingly still, Copenhagen School theorists view policing as a positive force: ‘In the West, the police are normally an institutionalized part of society that ensures continuous functioning’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 54). They praise the pacification role of the modern state (Greenwood and Wæver, 2013: 489) and ignore the longstanding use of police in defending class and racial inequality and (hetero)sexual mores (Amar, 2013; Browne, 2015; Davis, 2003; James, 2000; Kelley, 2000; Sexton, 2007; Singh, 2016), and violently occupying indigenous land (Bell and Schreiner, 2018; Byrd, 2011; Dhillon, 2015; Fanon, 1963; Nettelbeck and Smandych, 2010; Razack 2015). Securitization theory also repeatedly refers to the US War on Drugs as a ‘niche securitization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 327–331, 2009: 265). This minimizes the transnational history of antiblack violence perpetrated by the US state leading into the mass incarceration of black and Latinx people (Davis, 2003; James, 2000; Rodriguez, 2006) and ignores American covert and counterinsurgency action globally, especially in Latin America. Policing ensures ‘good’ order for those privileged by whiteness, property ownership, gender norms, and/or settler status. The constitutive role of policing and law in the racial, (settler-)colonial, sexual, and class violence of ‘normal politics’ is occluded as a direct result of securitization theory’s reliance on civilizationist oppositions between politics versus security and politicization versus securitization. Classic securitization theory is civilizationist in that it believes that there are more or less politically and morally developed civilizations. It identifies ‘normal politics’ with (European) civilization and ‘securitization’ with a return to (racialized) primal anarchy. As a result, it depicts ‘underdeveloped’ civilizations as threats to supposedly more advanced ones. This becomes especially clear when examining securitization theory’s ideas about ‘state failure’. Securitization theory claims that in ‘developed’ states (Buzan et al., 1998: 28) a civilized political sphere generally fends off securitization, except when ‘securitization is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). By contrast, in ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states securitization runs amok: ‘In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states … much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 28). This excessive securitization, in turn, leads to primal (or ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Kaplanesque’) anarchy, wherein the state ‘fails to take root or spirals into disintegration. This situation can lead to prolonged periods of primal anarchy, as is currently the case in Afghanistan and various parts of Africa, in which the state is only a shadow and reality is one of rival warlords and gangs’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 50, emphasis added; for analysis of the colonial preoccupation with Afghan ‘tribes’, see Manchanda, 2018). Discourses of state failure are ‘irredeemably rooted in an imperial and racialized imagination’ (Gruffydd Jones, 2015: 65; see also Grovogui, 2001; Shilliam, 2013; Wai, 2012a, 2012b). While they may avoid overt reference to race, they operate within a lineage of racial discourse that emerged to justify colonialism and continuing trusteeship. This racial hierarchy is fully represented in securitization theory’s list of weak and failing states: Nigeria under Abacha, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and ‘various parts of Africa’, the USSR under Stalin, Bosnia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and so on (see Buzan et al., 1998: 28, 50, 69, 146). This is a racial discourse: ‘primal anarchy’ is primarily located in ‘brown’ (‘Afghanistan’) and ‘black’ (‘parts of Africa’) regions.

### Link---Security Policy

#### Security politics plays a key role in reinforcing a racialized lens of politics, enforcing scapegoating and denial from political spheres.

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

Foreign security policy. First, racial hierarchy, through “colored” perceptions of foreign threats and national interest, has direct implications for how countries conduct foreign policy on a wide range of security and military issues, including alliance politics, regional order building, and territorial expansion. A few exceptional works on race in IR have emphasized that **racial identity can be an important factor in the formation, stability, and durability of alliances in international politics**. Focusing on the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–1923),Búzás (2013) proposes that racial prejudice inflates perceptions of threat and aggressive intentions from racially dissimilar countries. He finds through extensive archival research that racial difference came to inflate British threat perceptions of Japan, predisposing the two allies toward discord and eventually the termination of the alliance at the 1921 Washington Conference. At the same time, Anglo–American racial similarity saved the United States and Britain from such racialized fears, despite frequent military tensions including the Venezuela crisis of 1895–1896. The dominant racial discourse of the trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon brotherhood drew the two countries toward foreign policy cooperation to a greater extent “than any other comparable pairs of states” (Vucetic 2011a, p. 403). Bell (2013) further notes that this prevailing White supremacist vision undergirded the fin de siècle discussion of racial utopianism—the claim that an Anglo-Saxon security community would eliminate all forms of interstate conflict (see also Vucetic 2011b).Racialized beliefs can also have far-reaching effects on other types of foreign security and military policies such as regional institution-building and territorial expansion. Hemmer &Katzenstein (2002) argue that perceived racial identity, among other components of collective identity, played an important yet underappreciated role in shaping starkly different American approaches to regional orders in postwar Europe and Asia. Despite a huge disparity in material capabilities between the United States and its regional allies in both regions, American policymakers established multilateral security institutions in Europe while opting for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia. **Postwar foreign policy elites viewed their potential Asian partners as part of an inferior race who were less trustworthy and thus ineligible for membership in a NATO-like multilateral security community.** Maass (2020) shows that the perception of the native population as racially inferior, dangerous, and thus inherently unsuited for republican governance also explains the limited American territorial expansion in Mexico.

### Link---Space

#### The 1AC forwards racist mythologies of white dominance over space. Their framing matters.

Haskins, 18—The Outline, citing Michael Ralph, professor of anthropology at NYU and Lucianne Walkowicz, Chair of Astrobiology at the Library of Congress (Caroline, “THE RACIST LANGUAGE OF SPACE EXPLORATION,” <https://theoutline.com/post/5809/the-racist-language-of-space-exploration?zd=1&zi=ix5ripys>, dml)

“You could argue that the effort to colonize space is likely to involve new forms of inequality: shifts in tax revenues and administrative priorities devoted to that,” said Michael Ralph, a professor of anthropology at NYU. “As opposed to [supporting] other social institutions that benefit people like health care, education, infrastructure.”

Earning money in space is an exciting prospect for a far-right, pro-business, anti-regulation politician like Cruz, and he explicitly associated it with European countries having colonized the Americas. Starting in the late 1400s, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal funded missions to the Americas in order to gather natural resources that would power up their economies. By stealing the land that made this resource extraction possible, colonizers used genocide, enslavement, biological weaponry, and warfare and that resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of indigenous people living in the “New World.” The concept of race, and therefore racism, was invented as a way of justifying their violence and legitimizing a hierarchy of race-divided labor.

Based off of what we know right now, the Moon and Mars are devoid of life, so this colonizing language is not actually putting other beings at risk. But, there is the risk that the same racist mythology used to justify violence and inequality on earth — such as the use of frontier, “cowboy” mythology to condone and promote the murder and displacement of indigenous people in the American West — will be used to justify missions to space. In a future where humans potentially do live on non-earth planets, that same racist mythology would carry through to who is allowed to exist on, and benefit from, extraterrestrial spaces.

On Earth, and in the United States specifically, the ideal of a merit-based society has been used to justify race-blind hiring policies that fail to account for, say, the implicit bias against black or Asian-sounding names, or the legacy of segregation, which continues to make children of color more vulnerable to attending underfunded schools. Narratives of “law and order” have also been used to justify racial profiling and harsher prison sentences for people of color than for white people who commit the same crimes. Not nearly enough work has been done here on Earth to ensure that these structural inequalities wouldn’t carry through.

“Those narratives do carry specific implications about how people living on other worlds might be structured,” Lucianne Walkowicz, the current Chair of Astrobiology at the Library of Congress, told The Outline. Walkowicz organized the Decolonizing Mars Conference that took place on June 27 as well as a public follow-up event planned for September, to discuss how colonial language is shaping our potential future in space. “Space is not just built for nothing, it’s built for people.”

When we think about humanity’s potential to exist on other planets, it’s important to consider who won’t have access to space, in part due to a total lack of concern over these issues by people who are able to access it. Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos intends to make space a place for the rich to use for adventure leisure, and SpaceX/Tesla founder Elon Musk has proposed that a Martian “colony” can save a selection of humanity from the collapse of civilization in some World War III scenario. Granted, right now, these are just words from billionaires who want to excite the public about their business ventures. But they suggest that if the economically and socially vulnerable are priced out of a life-saving journey from Earth, it is a justifiable loss.

“All of these things that are said off the cuff [by billionaires] have some implications that are concrete and count some people in, and some people out,” Walkowicz said.

Part of that concern is fueled by the fact that Cruz and Pence have presented the path to settling space as one that will be privately funded, but lead by the U.S. government. In the Destination Mars subcommittee meeting, Cruz said, “At the end of the day, the commercial sector is going to be able to invest billions more in dollars in getting this job [of getting to Mars] done.” In his Thursday remarks regarding the Space Force, Pence also implied that celestial territories would be treated as private property (even though owning private property in space is explicitly illegal per the Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. and dozens of other nations signed in 1967).

“While other nations increasingly possess the capability to operate in space, not all of them share our commitment to freedom, to private property, and the rule of law,” Pence said. “So as we continue to carry American leadership in space, so also will we carry America’s commitment to freedom into this new frontier.”

This approach to public-private partnerships directly mirrors colonist practices. For instance, the British East India Company violently colonized parts of India on behalf of the company, but over time, ownership of the stolen land shifted to Great Britain.

While these risks feel a part of a far away future, in the present, idealizing colonization as a positive, replicable aspect of American history speaks to an unsettling indifference from leaders about the violent history of colonization. And by referencing historical events that victimized people of color, leaders paint a vision of the future in which people of color continue to be excluded, Walkowicz said that the social and economic legacy of colonization is ignored.

By using narratives of adventurism and heroics, white Americans were able to convince other white Americans that they were not only entitled to steal and conquest land and persons, but that it was their destiny. Ralph said to The Outline that this mythology remains central to the way Americans conceptualize their history and culture.

“Colonization is portrayed as a heroic conquest,” Ralph said. “These practices are framed as central to American identity, essential to governance, politics, and all major social institution. But not depicted as a colonizing that is one caused by violence, displacement, dispossession.”

Even when people aren’t explicitly referring to settlements in space as “colonies,” they still use the rhetoric of colonizing the New World and the American frontier, which erases the stories of and violence against the people of color who lived and ranched in the region. But how did this language start being used in the first place?

Presidents have also used frontierism and colonialism to get white citizens behind their agenda. When President John F. Kennedy announced his intention to bring Americans to the Moon in 1962, he paraphrased one of the earliest colonists on the North American continent.

“William Bradford, speaking in 1630 of the founding of the Plymouth Bay Colony, said that all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage,” Kennedy said.

Bradford was the governor of the Plymouth Bay Colony at the time of the Pequot War. In an overnight attack, British colonizers massacred four hundred soldiers, non-soldiers, and children. Bradford later described the act of genocide as a Christian victory. “...victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the prays therof to God,” Bradford wrote, “who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to inclose their enemies in their hands, and give them so speedy a victory over so proud and insulting an enemy.”

Although Kennedy did not characterize his vision for the Moon as creating a “colony” specifically, the association he wanted to create is clear: The Moon is the next version of the New World, the next frontier for American conquest.

In his speech, Kennedy continues that men like Bradford teach us that “man, in his quest for knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred.” However, if “man” is a stand-in for “white colonizers,” “knowledge and progress” unabashedly brushes over the lives of indigenous persons and people of color that were lost in their quest to “explore.” It’s a profusely sanitized version of reality.

“It’s fascinating that a term like ‘colonizing’ can be seen in neutral terms when it can’t exist without violence and dispossession,” Ralph said. It can’t exist without violence to establish a political hierarchy. Every colonial project is about managing populations, subjugating people, extracting resources.”

But Kennedy was not the first person to use of colonizing language in the context of space. John Wilkins, one of the first people who ever theorized about humanity’s future in space, wrote “A Discourse Concerning a New World and Another Planet” back in 1638, where he argued that the Moon will be a place for human habitation in the future. Although it was a piece of science fiction theorization at the time, Wilkins justified his argument by saying that God created the Earth and stars for people to use in his honor.

Colonizers are adventurers, Wilkins argues, whose ideals are worth replicating on other planets. “The invention of some other means for our convenience to the Moon cannot seem more incredible to us, than this did at first to them, to be discouraged in our hopes of the like success,” Wilkins wrote, admitting that any mission to the moon would be far in the future. “We have not now any [Sir Francis] Drake, or Columbus, to undertake this voyage, or any Daedalus to invent a convenience through the air.”

Sir Francis Drake was a slave-trader, and of course, Christopher Columbus is responsible for the genocide of almost 3 million people on the island of Hispaniola (now the Dominican Republic and Haiti).

As space travel has become more technologically feasible, science-fiction writers have speculated about how a space society would actually function. Arthur C. Clarke envisioned that “colonial” would be a dirty word in space in his 1954 book Earthflight: “And to do [enter Solar politics], one had to go to Earth; as in the days of the Caesars, there was no alternative. Those who believed otherwise or pretended to — risked being tagged with the dreaded word ‘colonial.’”

For Clarke, colonialism was equated with privilege in a space society, not because of racism and violence on Earth. Later in the novel, Clarke doesn’t hesitate to compare travelling between planets, and the nobility of doing so, with British colonizers travelling between continents in earlier centuries.

Adilifu Nama, a professor of African American Studies at Loyola Marymount University who has written about the representation of race in science fiction, said that science fiction movies and books during the 1950s and 1960s often included narratives of invasion from alien lifeforms directly alongside conceptualizations of existing in other worlds. These anxious science fiction narratives became popular during the Civil Rights Movement.

“We had [an] invasion emerging [during the Civil Rights Movement] of black folks invading these once pristine white spaces: with public transportation, public schools, and eventually particular neighbourhoods and black folks having access to better, more upscale neighbourhoods,” Nama said. “So there is also this invasion society around racial purity, and the tensions of science fiction can be read not only as Cold War anxieties, but racial anxieties about the other.”

Ralph said to The Outline that the Space Race of the 1950s and 60s shouldn’t be seen as purely a nationalist competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union: it was also a distraction from the Civil Rights Movement.

“A lot of what we think of as the Space Race was the US and Russia competing as rivals for supremacy in space back in the 1950s, but also that movement was about civil rights and the struggle for justice for Americans,” Ralph said. “In a way, you could argue that space exploration has historically been used to shift public attention away from the struggle of social justice.”

According to Walkowicz, that people dip into the violent, racist history of colonialism and gloss over their language using a sense of adventure provided by the American frontier is no coincidence. “The people for whom the American frontier myth were constructed, who were primarily white men, also now have the narrative of space,“ Walkowicz said. “And because tech is so incredibly non-diverse, and has been so slow to change even in those small ways in which it has, I think a lot of those narratives go unquestioned.”

The people with the power to make a future in space possible, such as Trump, Pence, and Cruz, or the money to actually get us there, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, are the same people who have and will always benefit from systemic racism and the potential economic glory from new economic ventures.

Ralph noted that prioritizing space travel undermines funding for sustainable forms of energy like wind and solar, and efficient ways to construct affordable houses and schools. It also has direct economic implications for the people who rely on any number of federally-funded social programs in the U.S.

“In Trump’s America, we have a lot of conservatives and even libertarians insisting there’s too much government spending on social programs, and yet Trump wants to use our federal funds to reinvigorate our space programs,” Ralph said. “Just like in the 1950s and 60s, [Trump] is using space exploration to cultivate nationalist sentiment and arguably shift questions away from questions of social justice and questions of inequality.”

### Link---Space Col

#### Space colonization is designed to by capitalist and exclusionary – White billionaires will monopolize resources and restrict the access of minorities

**Haskins 18**(Caroline, Business Insider, where covers artificial intelligence, data collection, and surveillance, “THE RACIST LANGUAGE OF SPACE EXPLORATION”, CS)

Earning money in space is an exciting prospect for a far-right, pro-business, anti-regulation politician like Cruz, and he explicitly associated it with European countries having colonized the Americas. Starting in the late 1400s, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal funded missions to the Americas in order to gather natural resources that would power up their economies. By stealing the land that made this resource extraction possible, colonizers used genocide, enslavement, biological weaponry, and warfare and that resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of indigenous people living in the “New World.” The concept of race, and therefore racism, was invented as a way of justifying their violence and [legitimizing a hierarchy of race-divided labor](https://books.google.com/books?id=UMMECgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Intimacies+of+Four+Continents&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwin_Pr4l-PcAhXGqlkKHaC6BQoQ6AEIJzAA#v=onepage&q=The%20Intimacies%20of%20Four%20Continents&f=false). Based off of what we know right now, the Moon and Mars are devoid of life, so this colonizing language is not actually putting other beings at risk. But, there is the risk that the same racist mythology used to justify violence and inequality on earth — such as the use of frontier, “cowboy” mythology to condone and promote the murder and displacement of indigenous people in the American West — will be used to justify missions to space. In a future where humans potentially do live on non-earth planets, that same racist mythology would carry through to who is allowed to exist on, and benefit from, extraterrestrial spaces. On Earth, and in the United States specifically, the ideal of a merit-based society has been used to justify race-blind hiring policies that fail to account for, say, the implicit bias against black or Asian-sounding names, or the legacy of segregation, which continues to make children of color more vulnerable to attending underfunded schools. Narratives of “law and order” have also been used to justify racial profiling and harsher prison sentences for people of color than for white people who commit the same crimes. Not nearly enough work has been done here on Earth to ensure that these structural inequalities wouldn’t carry through. “Those narratives do carry specific implications about how people living on other worlds might be structured,” Lucianne Walkowicz, the current Chair of Astrobiology at the Library of Congress, told The Outline. Walkowicz organized the Decolonizing Mars Conference that took place on June 27 as well as a public follow-up event planned for September, to discuss how colonial language is shaping our potential future in space. “Space is not just built for nothing, it’s built for people.” When we think about humanity’s potential to exist on other planets, it’s important to consider who won’t have access to space, in part due to a total lack of concern over these issues by people who are able to access it. Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos intends to make space a place for the rich to use for adventure leisure, and SpaceX/Tesla founder Elon Musk has proposed that a Martian “colony” can save a selection of humanity from the collapse of civilization in some World War III scenario. Granted, right now, these are just words from billionaires who want to excite the public about their business ventures. But they suggest that if the economically and socially vulnerable are priced out of a life-saving journey from Earth, it is a justifiable loss. “All of these things that are said off the cuff [by billionaires] have some implications that are concrete and count some people in, and some people out,” Walkowicz said. Part of that concern is fueled by the fact that Cruz and Pence have presented the path to settling space as one that will be privately funded, but lead by the U.S. government. In the Destination Mars subcommittee meeting, Cruz said, “At the end of the day, the commercial sector is going to be able to invest billions more in dollars in getting this job [of getting to Mars] done.” In his Thursday remarks regarding the Space Force, Pence also implied that celestial territories would be treated as private property (even though owning private property in space is explicitly illegal per the Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. and dozens of other nations signed in 1967). “While other nations increasingly possess the capability to operate in space, not all of them share our commitment to freedom, to private property, and the rule of law,” Pence said. “So as we continue to carry American leadership in space, so also will we carry America’s commitment to freedom into this new frontier.” This approach to public-private partnerships directly mirrors colonist practices. For instance, the British East India Company violently colonized parts of India on behalf of the company, but over time, ownership of the stolen land shifted to Great Britain.

### Link---Ukraine

#### Using Ukraine to justify militarization makes future conflict inevitable---NATO’s attempts to dominate and contain Russia and China put Ukraine directly in the line of fire

**Kimberley 22**(Margret, New York-based writer and activist for peace and justice issues, “Does Ukraine Expose White Supremacist Foreign Policy?”, CS)

The narrative that only white people deserve peace and security is all the more shameful because the global south suffers from war and privation as a direct result of US/NATO actions. It is NATO that destroyed the nation of Libya, NATO which attempted to do the same in Syria, NATO that occupied Afghanistan, NATO which wages war across [African countries](https://www.blackagendareport.com/nato-and-africa-relationship-colonial-violence-and-structural-white-supremacy) with US, French and British troops deployed across the continent. The white world causes suffering and then says that the people of the global south are “uncivilized” with no rights that need to be respected. A Watson Institute of Brown University [study](https://watson.brown.edu/research/2020/Post-9/11DisplacementStudy) showed that more than 37 million people in North Africa, Western and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa have been displaced by the US and its allies since 2001. The humanitarian disasters begun years ago are ongoing, as refugees use the Mediterranean and even the US border with Mexico as points of escape. After experiencing wars of aggression these nations are then subjected to punishment as the United States steals Afghanistan’s assets and keeps Syria under the thumb of Caesar Sanctions. These thefts cause more suffering and even death as nations are robbed of the ability to care for their people. Who is civilized and who is not? Ukraine has been pushed to the forefront of American thought in order to defend the imperialist foreign policy which led to the current conflict with Russia. If the blue eyed nation is suffering it is because of US and NATO arrogance and aggression. Ukraine’s current situation is a direct result of the 2014 coup engineered by the US and its EU partners. An elected president was dispatched and a civil war began that has killed some 14,000 people. Ukraine is a US colony with a puppet government now under military attack. Ukrainians are themselves refugees as they flee to neighboring Poland, Romania, Slovakia and other countries. It is the supposedly advanced, democratic, and supposedly civilized who have created their problems. Yet once again bare faced racism is evident. African migrants and students in Ukraine were prohibited from boarding trains and buses that could take them to safety. A group of [Jamaican students](https://twitter.com/JamaicaGleaner/status/1497947605254430725?s=20&t=j8--6150_hIDfaLzEOxNlQ) was forced to walk 20 kilometers when they were forced off of a bus enroute to Poland. Africans and Jamaicans live and study all over the world because the US and Europe underdeveloped their nations through a variety of means. Yet Ukrainians and Poles didn’t see people in need of help. They determined that the non-blondes were not deserving of assistance. Ironically, it is the white supremacist underpinnings of US/NATO foreign policy which has created all of Ukraine’s suffering. The need to dominate, to “contain” Russia and its ally China is not playing out the way they had hoped but the Ukrainians be damned. The MinskII agreement which was unanimously approved in the United Nations Security Council was a roadmap to peace. Ukraine should be a neutral nation but that is the exact opposite of what its lords and masters in Washington want. The good faith negotiations that could resolve the crisis are a non-starter because NATO is a very dishonest broker.

## Impact

### Impact---Existential Threat

#### Treat white supremacy as an existential threat.

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

### Impact---Memmi

#### Don’t even let them into the house.

Memmi 2k. Albert Memmi, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, pg. 163-165

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved.  Yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions**.**  One cannot be indulgent toward racism.  One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask.  To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human.  To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence.   It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the  condition of the dominated;  that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is. and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one's moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences.  Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is  the very negation.  This is almost a redundancy.  One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is "the truly capital sin."fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity's spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed, All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end. The ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot.  If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace.  True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

### Impact---Racial Hierarchy

#### IR is utilized to establish a system of racial logics that overcodes the globe

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

As the Howard School knew, race is a social construct that categorizes or classifies humans ac-cording to contrived differences. Its categories—races—are always and everywhere contested, a product of social struggle. As such, race is nearly always vertically stratified, entitling members of the ranked categories different rights and privileges within society. Omi & Winant (1994, p. 60)center this idea of racial hierarchy in their theory of racial formation. They explain that hierarchy is established and sustained as a racial project such that “everybody learns...the rules of racial classification and of her racial identity...inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes ‘common sense’—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world.” As Bonilla-Silva (1997) suggests, racialization—the process by which groups are attributed racial meaning—conditions how actors relate to the social structures and institutional systems they in-habit. As an organizing principle of super- and subordination, it orders race hierarchically and engenders behaviors and interests to fit the position of the groups in the racial regime. Fanon [2008 (1952)] perceived racial hierarchy and the process of racialization in the language of colonial domination. To internalize the norms of the colonizer was to participate in one’s own oppression, to reflect the very hierarchical structures of alienation. Once racial stratification is established and its “racial logics” are absorbed (Hobson & Sharman 2005), race becomes an in-dependent criterion for vertical hierarchy in a society, both domestic and international. And to be sure, race as a hierarchy is international. Wynter (2003) argues that a globally expanding West used race to define and order the human. The color line encoded deserving and undeserving status within Western imperial orders. Racial hierarchy becomes important in IR in at least two fundamental ways, explored in more detail below. Though the coin may eventually be revealed as multisided, we see perceived deficiency and hostility as the two faces of racism in world politics. In the first face, countries below the color line are perceived to be deficient in some essential attribute. Through the mid-twentieth century, this face of racism was manifested in the “standard of civilization” criteria for establishing sovereignty and acceptance into the family of nations. As the norm of juridical sovereignty took hold after the formation of the United Nations, conferring sovereignty on any recognized member of the international community regardless of their capacity to govern their territory effectively ( Jackson 1990), the same projection of deficiency onto countries with majorities of people of color continued in the practice and interpretation of international law. In the second face, non-White-majority countries are perceived by White-majority countries to be inherently aggressive or threatening. Within a racialized global order, dominant actors perceive racially “inferior” foreign countries as potentially destabilizing to the status quo. This is precisely how Du Bois [2005(1906), p. 34] construed the problem of the color line: the prospect of war and peace hinges upon how White-majority countries cope with perceived challenges from the “awakening of the brown and black races.” The integrated analytic framework in Figure 1 illustrates the intersections of racial hierarchy, international law, and foreign policy. First, norms, including the norm of racial hierarchy, are so deeply woven into the fabric of social life that they appear natural, effectively conditioning the design and enforcement of an international legal order (i). Once the embedded social norm(in this case, the norm of racial hierarchy) is codified, international law further authorizes and promotes it (ii), which is often the intended goal of norms entrepreneurs in international politics In other words, international law, racialized in its content and enforcement, helps consolidate what Reus-Smit (2017, p. 875) calls the “authorized forms of difference” along the color line. As discussed in more detail below, uneven application of law brace plagues international politics. Providing rules that order relations between states with different status, rights, and responsibilities, international law thus guides the practice of foreign policy making (Figure 1, iii), which in turn reproduces an unequal global order that is underwritten by the international legal system as well as the racial hierarchy embedded within it (iv). Racial hierarchy also implicates foreign policy and practice more directly. The racial norm shapes foreign policies by conditioning how actors perceive their interests, interpret the position and interests of racial others, and act accordingly. As emphasized by Jackson (2006, p. 16), racial hierarchy affects foreign policy making through the process of legitimation, defined as “the process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries, ruling some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable.” By supplying the language of legitimation that shapes predominant foreign policy discourses, racial hierarchy thus renders certain foreign policies acceptable and therefore possible (Figure 1, v). Similar to how international law facilitates the authorization of racial hierarchy (ii), foreign policy and practice in turn further reinforce the norm of racial hierarchy, reifying the contrived racial categories and differences (vi). Below, we provide a more in-depth discussion on how racial hierarchy shapes the formulation of foreign policy. Altogether, the interactions of racial hierarchy, international law, and foreign policy reaffirm one another and produce a racialized world that is taken for granted.

### AT: Empirics

#### Modern IR frameworks selectively employ willful amnesia to justify their methodology – their theories aren’t supported by empirics by rather by the blatant omission of them

**Zvobgo and Loken 20**(Kelebogile, assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary and founder and director of the International Justice Lab, Meredith, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, “Why Race Matters in International Relations”, CS)

Take the “big three” IR paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These dominant frames for understanding global politics are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations that limit the field’s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization. Core concepts, like anarchy and hierarchy, are raced: They are rooted in discourses that center and favor Europe and the West. These concepts implicitly and explicitly pit “developed” against “undeveloped,” “modern” against “primitive,” “civilized” against “uncivilized.” And their use is racist: These invented binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe While realism and liberalism were built on Eurocentrism and used to justify white imperialism, this fact is not widely acknowledged in the field. For instance, according to neorealists, there exists a “balance of power” between and among “great powers.” Most of these great powers are, not incidentally, white-majority states, and they sit atop the hierarchy, with small and notably less-white powers organized below them. In a similar vein, raced hierarchies and conceptions of control ground the concept of cooperation in neoliberal thought: Major powers own the proverbial table, set the chairs, and arrange the place settings. Constructivism, which rounds out the “big three” approaches, is perhaps best positioned to tackle race and racism. Constructivists reject the as-given condition of anarchy and maintain that anarchy, security, and other concerns are socially constructed based on shared ideas, histories, and experiences. Yet with few notable exceptions, constructivists rarely acknowledge how race shapes what is shared. Despite the dominance of the “big three” in the modern study of IR, many of the arguments they advance, such as the balance of power, are not actually supported by evidence outside of modern Europe. Consider the democratic peace theory. The theory makes two key propositions: that democracies are less likely to go to war than are nondemocracies, and that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other. The historical record shows that democracies have actually not been less likely to fight wars—if you include their colonial conquests. Meanwhile, in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, democratizing states have experienced more internal conflicts than their less-democratic peers. Yet leaders in the West have invoked democratic peace theory to justify invading and occupying less-democratic, and notably less-white, countries. This is a key element of IR’s racial exclusion: The state system that IR seeks to explain arises from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and established European principles of statehood and sovereignty. Far from 17th-century relics, these principles are enshrined in the United Nations Charter—the foundation for global governance since 1945. But non-European nations did not voluntarily adopt European understandings of statehood and sovereignty, as IR scholars often mythologize. Instead, Europe, justified by Westphalia, divided the world between the modern, “civilized” states and conquered those which they did not think belonged in the international system. IR scholar Sankaran Krishna has argued that, because IR privileges theorizing over historical description and analysis, the field enables this kind of whitewashing. Western concepts are prioritized at the expense of their applicability in the world. Krishna called this “a systematic politics of forgetting, a willful amnesia, on the question of race.”

### AT: Not the Root Cause

#### IR is rooted in racism and eurocentrism

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

In a parallel fashion, as suggested above, race is hidden behind international law and the principle of sovereign equality. Rooted in conceptions of natural law, international law is necessarily universal and based on principles of equality. Yet, race was implicated in the development of international law almost from its very origins (see, e.g., Pitts 2018). The vision of equality at its core was immediately challenged by Europe’s encounter with the rest of the world during the age of discovery. If international law applied universally to peoples, their territory, and their existing governance structures, then Europeans would have to recognize these unfamiliar polities as equal to their own, which in turn would have prevented them from expropriating the land and enslaving those who lived on it. To justify expropriation, international law thus required the creation or application of racialized hierarchies that considered non-European societies as less than human. The interpretation of race as a stable, self-evident difference became the marker from which more elaborate notions of difference, like “civilization,” were constructed (Anghie 2006). In one such justification, John Locke declared the territory occupied by Indigenous peoples in the Americas as forfeit for their failure to enclose and cultivate the land (see Arneil 1996). In short, international law required Europeans to assign a lesser status to others in order to reconcile the conception of equality under the law that governed their own relations with the desire to exploit the “new worlds” they “discovered.” Thus, race was tethered to the rationale for conquest undertaken by European powers. Race continued to animate international law and relations between Europe and the rest of the world well into the twentieth century. In negotiations over the League of Nations in 1919, for instance, Japan’s proposed language on racial equality was rejected. Although it received broad support, US President Woodrow Wilson, who himself had resegregated the US civil service, was in the Chair and summarily declared that such an important change required unanimity, which effectively killed the proposal. Following World War II, renewed calls for formal racial equality at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and later the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1969 led to the prohibition of racism, but subtly embedded it in the precept of sovereignty and the corresponding doctrine of domestic jurisdiction that allowed member countries to prohibit international oversight of their domestic racial regimes(Búzás 2021). As a shield against foreign interference, sovereignty became a way of preserving racial inequality at home. Its universal standard also gave rise to an international legal order that obscured racism from view. By the mid-twentieth century, non-European societies acquired the status of sovereign state-hood previously denied by international law. On its face, decolonization overcame the notion that racial others were somehow not ready for full sovereignty (Grovogui 1996). In practice, however, writing race out of law was necessary to conceal, and therefore maintain, the uneven application of international norms and rules along constructed racial difference. By implication, formal manifestations of race are no longer permissible. But at the same time, the projection of racial deficiency by White-majority countries onto especially Black-majority states is found in the practice and interpretation of contemporary international law. Although engagement varies across the movement of critical race theories and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), much of the work within these reconstructive traditions has sought to uncover the ongoing dynamics of racialized power that constitute international law and relations. The racialization of international law can be seen in several contemporary legal and political trends that are at least implicitly premised on a conception of non-White-majority countries as being deficient and in need of assistance or corrective action by North American or European states

### AT: Our Threats are Real

#### Western epistemology will always present itself as indisputably true---subjecting the rest of the world to disempowerment and objectification

**Van Milders and Toros 20**(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)

We advance here a two-pronged conception of disciplinary violence. On the one hand, as is argued in this section, the epistemic violence of colonial disciplinarity shuts down debate and critique and leaves unhindered violent regimes of governmentality. On the other hand, as it will be argued in the next section, this form of violence is epitomised in the international expert. What moulds this all together is, apart from disciplinary fragmentation and hierarchy, the insulation of rational, objective and universal knowledge (typically associated with Western epistemology) from irrational, subjective and particular knowledge (although it is commonly referred to as experience or a perspective as opposed to knowledge). What this concerns is a colonial matrix of power that is based on a racist classification of the world (Quijano, 2007: 171). This is indeed one, as Kerem Nisancioglu argues in this issue, that still affects IR’s racialised account of one of its key elements of analysis: sovereignty (2020). The colonial infrastructure of knowledge production is thus part of a much broader matrix of colonial hierarchies that were imposed through European imperialism since 1492. This involved, among others, a racist hierarchy that privileged European whiteness and a sexist hierarchy that privileged the European masculinity (Grosfoguel, 2009). Indeed, the colonial framework is deeply racist and gendered, and we understand it as such in this article. It also includes a global epistemic hierarchy that privileges the Western mode of knowledge production as the only viable way of producing knowledge that is universal, objective, neutral and scientific. As mentioned above, this concerns ideas about organising, classifying and storing knowledge, yet it is specifically by hiding its locus of enunciation that its claims towards universality are facilitated. Indeed, similar to decadent disciplines, Western epistemology presents itself as coinciding with universality and is therefore capable of generating absolute knowledge by subjugating other modes of knowledge production as particular, subjective, biased and un-scientific. This epistemic subsequently operates through binary conceptions such as the West and the Rest that, on the one hand, consolidate a position of imperial hegemony while, on the other, cement other perspectives, knowledges and experiences into a subjugated position (Hall, 1996). The result of this is, in the words of Frantz Fanon, a dividing of the world in a zone of being and zone of nonbeing. For if it is only the Western mode of knowledge production that is capable of generating universal knowledge, then this means that the Western experience itself necessarily corresponds to the experience of humanity as such. Everything else is not a different type of knowledge – since this would affect the appeal to universality that marks Western epistemology – but is simply non-existent. What separates the zone of nonbeing from the zone of being is an unsurmountable line that strips the non-Western other of their ontological resistance. In the zone of nonbeing, colonial racialisation inescapably subjects one to disempowerment and objectification. For Fanon, the reasons behind this are plain and simple: ‘The white man wants the world; he wants it for himself alone. He finds himself predestined master of this world. He enslaves it. An acquisitive relation is established between the world and him’ (Fanon, 2008: 97).

### AT: Liberalism Good

#### Liberal peace is inseparable from the violent façade of liberal pacification which obscures the escalating cycle of phenomenological violence at the heart of the world order that kills value to life and ensures nuclear war

Baron, et al, 19—Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (Ilan Zvi, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, anticlimactically just an independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” International Studies Quarterly (2019) 63, 199–212, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence.

Pacavere

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming).

Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations.

Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors.

Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13

FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986).

The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15

Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

Liberal Pacification

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.

Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order

Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens.

Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification produces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence.

Conclusion

Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification.

The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society.

Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace.

Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.

### AT: Realism Good

#### Realism is bad, ensures racialization is cemented in all areas of IR.

**Vitalis 2K**(Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations”, CS)

IR theorists have often hidden behind realism’s wings to face these kinds of criticism; they have argued that the distinctiveness of their subject matter sets them apart and makes the ‘norm against noticing’ irrelevant in this case. In relations among states, where material power and interest govern the behaviour of actors bent on survival in a violence-prone environment, an overarching logic of security and the national interest prevails. Even a ‘domestic politics’ of white supremacy, to use a familiar adage, stops at ‘the water’s edge’. Pursuit of this particular line of thought, however, would quickly take the naïve defender of an American-invented tradition down a slippery slope. The empirical quandary remains. ‘Until recently, race was a central category in international relations’ for statesmen, intellectuals, and the white working classes of the colonial powers and the industrialising colonial-settler states.17 More crucially still, realism’s own proximate indigenous roots in the US may be found in part in the ‘rising tide of colour’ theory in the 1920s and related strains of Anglo-Saxon declinism.18 Realism was not so much ‘founded’ in the 1940s by a wave of émigré continental European scholars, but recast in line with Cold War imperatives, which included the jettisoning of what was coming to be recognised as overt racist doctrines by whites who ruled the ‘kingdom of culture’ and the writing of a more useable past for their adopted discipline.19 What needs to be explained is not how a particular domain of intellectual life somehow escaped the bounds of ascriptive Americanism—it didn’t—but why the ‘norm against noticing’ appears to work so much more powerfully there than elsewhere inside the academy until now? The question, I believe, involves ‘domestic institutions’. Few signs remain of the academy’s insurgent moment inside professional IR in the US.20 The oppositional and anti-imperialist values that constituted the original identity of political economy in the 1960s and 1970s are reflected more powerfully today in parts of Anthropology, Cultural Studies, Gender Studies, Literature, and History than in Political Science, and more in British Political Science than in the American Political Science Association. This might be gauged by comparing the renaissance in the study of the culture of empire and American expansionism with the paucity of work by political scientists. One might look at the index of the New Left Review over the past two decades for a sense of what is ‘left’ in Political Science and who in American IR might be publishing there, aside from Richard Falk (answer: no one). Last, and undoubtedly most important, one might look around the room at the next seminar, conference plenary, or talk for insight into the culture of American IR and the operation of the ‘norm against noticing’. The absence of virtually any, let alone a critical mass of, black thinkers and writers in the field today goes a long way toward explaining why white supremacy remains an unexposed foundation of the field and why the Black Atlantic remains an unrecognised source (for mostly white IR scholars that is) of the emancipatory counter-currents that we know today as imperialism theory, ‘underdevelopment’ ‘postcolonial theory’, dependencia, world systems analysis, and so on.

### AT: Realism True

#### Scholars critiquing realism are forced to make their theories fit within constraining models of conceptualization – it isn’t that realism is true, rather it is built to subvert critique

**Henderson 13**(Errol, Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory”, CS)

The centrality of race and racism in the foundations of IR and their enduring impact on world affairs towards the end of the millennium contrasts with the relative dearth of mainstream scholarship on the subject in IR. For example, Doty’s (1998, 136) survey of mainstream journals in IR for the period of 1945 –1993 (World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Studies) ‘revealed only one article with the word race in the title, four with the term minorities and 13 with the term ethnicity’. Given that at its inception IR focused heavily on issues of race and racism, the marginalization of race and racism in mainstream IR journals (and textbooks) begs the question of what accounts for the apparent disparity? Doty (1998, 145) argues that ‘the dominant understandings of theory and explanation in International Relations’ preclude conceptualizations of ‘complex issues/concepts such as race’ and result in their marginalization or force them ‘into constraining modes of conceptualization and explanation’. For Krishna (2001, 401), the complexity is related less to the issue of racism than to the methodological orientations that often privilege abstract theorizing over historical analyses, which allows IR theorists to whitewash the historical content of global affairs, especially ‘the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era’. Ignoring the role of racism facilitates this whitewash. He adds that ‘abstraction, usually presented as the desire of the discipline to engage in theory-building rather than in descriptive or historical analysis, is a screen that simultaneously rationalizes and elides the details of these encounters. By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction the discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in’ (Krishna 2001, 401– 402). Further, ‘overattention’ on the part of scholars to issues related to racism in IR ‘is disciplined by professional practices that work as taboo’ and may label such orientations as ‘too historical or descriptive’ and label such students as ‘not adequately theoretical’ and ‘lacking in intellectual rigor’ (Krishna 2001, 402). Moreover, where the impact of race and racism is analysed, insufficient attention is paid to the relevance of struggles related to race and racism to basic conceptions of fundamental issues in world politics such as power, war, freedom or democracy. For example, Persaud (2001, 116) maintains that ‘what needs to be underlined is that the struggle for racial equality has been fundamental to the emergence of democracy as a whole, not just for the colored world’ (2001, 116). Persaud and Walker (2001, 374) claim that race has not been ignored in IR as much as it ‘has been given the epistemological status of silence’. This silence is linked by Maclean (1981, 110) to ‘invisibility’, which ‘refers to the removal (not necessarily through conscious action) from a field of enquiry, either concrete aspects of social relations, or of certain forms of thought about them’. Vitalis (2000) also acknowledges a ‘norm against noticing’ white racism throughout mainstream IR discourse (also see Depelchin 2005). Each of these processes perpetuates the racist assumptions embedded in the foundations of IR theory where they serve as the ‘priors’ of the main propositions. These assumptions may be exposed by tracing the racist claims that inform IR theory. This approach is different from that undertaken in most studies of racism in IR, which usually focus on one of four approaches: (1) examinations of the impact of non-racial factors on racial outcomes, such as the geographical studies of Linneaus and the physical anthropological works of Blumenbach and Kant, which attempted to determine the extent to which environmental and climatic factors led to the creation of different races;3 (2) examinations of the impact of racial outcomes on non-racial factors, such as studies of the effects of racial stratification on domestic outcomes (for example, development or democracy), or the impact of racial differences on the likelihood of violence within or between states (for example, Deutsch 1970; Shepherd and LeMelle 1970); (3) examinations of the impact of racist practices on the IR of states and non-state actors, such as studies of diplomatic historians on racist practices such as international slavery, imperial conquest, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, occupation, or racial discrimination, among single states, several states, or international organizations (for example, Elkins 2004; Hochschild 1998; Tinker 1977; Vincent 1982; Winant 2001); and (4) examinations of the impact of racist ideology on the IR of states and nonstate actors, such as studies on the impact of racism on foreign policy (for example, Hunt 1987; Lauren 1988; Anderson 2003), imperialism (for example, Rodney 1974), state-making (for example, Cell 1982; Fredrickson 1982; Mamdani 1996; Marx 1998), diasporization (Harris 1982; Walters 1993) or international war (Dower 1986). While studies utilizing each of these approaches have contributed to our understanding of the role of racism in world politics, they have largely ignored the issue of primary concern to us here: how racism informs the major paradigms of IR theory such as realism and liberalism.4 Racism informs IR theory mainly through its influence on the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions that undergird its paradigms. These assumptions operate individually and in combination. For example, racist empirical assumptions bifurcate humanity on the basis of race and determine our view of what/whom we study and how we study it/them—privileging the experiences of ‘superior’ peoples and their societies and institutions. These assumptions also lead us to privilege ethical orientations of the ‘superior’ peoples which justify their privileged status. In such a context, epistemological assumptions that reflect and reinforce the racist dualism are more likely to become ascendant, and ‘knowledge’ that supports the racist dichotomy—both the privileged position of the racial hegemon and the underprivileged position of the racial subaltern—is more likely to be viewed as valid. Such knowledge drawn from the empirical domain becomes legitimized through ethical justifications that ‘naturalize’ the racial hierarchy. In this way, the separate dimensions often reinforce each other. Whether or not the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions operate singly or in combination, it is important to demonstrate the role of these assumptions in IR theory today, especially given that mainstream IR also provides prominent critiques of racism. Ignoring these critiques would misrepresent the degree of racism in the field and disregard the challenge to racist discourse within IR from IR theorists themselves. For example, few IR scholars openly embrace a racist ontology that assumes for whites a higher order of being than for nonwhites.5 Moreover, racist ethical assumptions usually receive the opprobrium they deserve in present IR discourse. Racist epistemological assumptions are largely challenged by the prevalence in IR theory of the view that our ‘knowledge’ of world politics usually requires us to have something approximating evidence to determine the accuracy of rival truth claims. Finally, racist empirical assumptions are checked by the dominant view in IR that our theses should be broadly applicable across states and societies and should be substantiated by crossnational and cross-temporal tests. But the sanguine view of the propensity of IR literature to check racist assumptions, or to generate non-racist theoretical discourse for the field, begs a fuller exploration of how ethical, epistemological and empirical assumptions underlie prominent theses in IR. The main sources of these racist assumptions that inform our present IR discourse are the primary theoretical constructs of most IR theory: the state of nature, the social contract and the conception of anarchy that derives from them.

## Framework

### Epistemology First

#### Epistemology comes first---the Kritik is a moment of invasion as we enter into IR centric spaces and introduce radical ideas---that shapes those spaces.

**Gani and Marshal** **22**(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)

Thus far, a lot of responsibility for challenging the racial and colonial dynamics of the academic–practitioner nexus has been placed with knowledge producers, whether within or outside academia. But it is necessary to emphasize that efforts have already been under way, not only to ‘decolonize’ our academic disciplines, but to bring that discourse into the public realm. At that point practitioners need to carry their share of responsibility in listening to and applying the expertise (whether academic or community-based) that can foster more just policies. Instead, the attention policy-makers give to expertise is often selective and politicized, based not on what can actually improve people’s lives but on what helps to justify the existing approaches adopted by governments. The current denigration and growing securitization of critical race theory, especially in the United States but increasingly elsewhere, is an example of attacks on emancipatory knowledges that challenge power and oppression. Offering another stark example of this, Amal Abu-Bakare explores in her article the lack of any serious attempts to confront Islamophobia in society, despite the wealth of research and expert advice from scholars and community-based practitioners available to policy-makers.55 Focusing on the cases of the UK and Canada, she highlights the way in which practitioner intervention, in this case that of security and police officials, has actively prevented the adoption of expert guidelines on tackling Islamophobia on the grounds that they might interfere with their counterterrorism strategies. In many ways this is a blatant acknowledgement from policy-makers that their counterterrorism strategy is inherently built upon racial tropes and discrimination. In contrast, so-called ‘neutral’ research on terrorism and/or counterterrorism is embraced by practitioners, precisely because such research might not ask uncomfortable questions about the racial foundations or assumptions that are necessary to enact their policies. Abu-Bakare’s article offers an example of the limitations of academic–practitioner knowledge exchange. Exhorting scholars to make their research policy relevant does not address the unequal receptivity towards critical research that may challenge policy. Nor does it sufficiently take into account the implicit disciplining that can take place in that process of knowledge exchange. Those very spaces or channels that are created to facilitate sharing, listening and negotiation between knowledge producers and practitioners (through all the blurred boundaries between them) may reproduce and reify hierarchies through unequal interactions. Is real dialogue possible if power dynamics render the interlocutors unequal?56 Or, in their efforts to be heard, taken seriously, and make their presence worthwhile, academics and other knowledge producers may find themselves being subtly socialized into the very modes of speech and thought that they sought to criticize. This can also happen in reverse when grassroots practitioners share spaces with scholars and elite institutions. The path-breaking and radical ideas needed to initiate change on some of the most deep-seated problems in politics and society may be diluted in such spaces for the sake of pragmatism and communication, undermining the ability to imagine real alternatives to the status quo. This is not to say that knowledge producers, whether academic or community-based, should not engage with policy-makers, but rather that they should be clear in what they seek to achieve—if, for example, constructive dialogue or receptivity to expertise is unlikely, it is at times necessary and an ethical responsibility simply to register alternative ideas or contestation. Returning to the point made at the start of this piece, this cautions us in how we champion ‘impact’ and knowledge–policy engagement, especially if we only recognize engagements that supplement and are ‘useful’ to systems of power rather than those that hold them to account.

### Privilege DA

#### Their evidence comes from a position of privilege---their authors ignore the complex racialization of great power relations compromising the quality of their theorizing and the field of IR itself

**Peterson 21**(V Spike, professor of international relations in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona, “Critical privilege studies: Making visible the reproduction of racism in the everyday and international relations”, CS)

Familiar structural inequalities – of race, gender, class, nationality – and corresponding systems of privilege constitute relations of domination and subordination that figure centrally in the social violence and multiple crises that international relations and security scholars struggle to address. These scholars, however, rarely engage a critique of privilege when interpreting these processes, which effectively perpetuates the invisibility (naturalization) of power relations and precludes more adequate critical theorizing. Privilege refers to socially conferred unearned advantages available to some by being constitutively denied to others. Two implications of this structural relationship: the privilege enjoyed by dominant groups is literally at the expense of subordinated groups, and systemic inequalities do not only harm those who are dominated but significantly benefit – every day and over time, intentionally and unintentionally, directly and indirectly – those who are privileged. Failing to ‘see’ this crucial, consequential and structural relationship – and its affective consequences – has enormous implications for how adequately we understand the reproduction of, and responses to, entrenched inequalities and the social violence they generate. Not least, we need to ‘see’ that conditions generating internalized inferiority in those who are subordinated have the effect of naturalizing internalized superiority in those who can, and typically do, assume that the advantages of privilege and their practices of domination are ‘just the way things are’. Given the global expanse of harms, resentments, and violences that we confront, I argue that critical theorists – in security studies, international relations, and elsewhere – cannot afford to persist in neglecting privilege. This neglect perpetuates ignore-ance of consequential power relations and obscures how practices of privilege, every day and everywhere, operate to reinforce, normalize, and reproduce structural inequalities. I assume that critical security studies seeks to further a reduction in emotional and embodied harms produced by, and productive of, structural inequalities, and I argue that doing so requires accurately understanding and actively dismantling the power relations of privilege. Accordingly, I contend that failure to critically engage how privilege operates severely compromises both the quality of current theorizing and the future field of critical security studies. My contribution, then, situates racism in the intersectional matrix of structural inequalities, foregrounds how systems of privilege operate to reproduce this matrix and its many harms, and examines the role of white privilege in reproducing the invisibility and normalization of racism (and its related inequalities). I present a condensed overview of what I call ‘critical privilege studies’2 and indicate how this analytical framing contributes to ‘a radically different, anti- or nonracist [international relations] and everyday’ (Rutazibwa, 2016: 199). I argue that the systematic study of privilege shifts our attention, illuminates unfamiliar patterns, and enriches critical theorizing within and beyond international relations. Critical privilege studies makes distinctive contributions, primarily by examining how those who benefit the most – every day and everywhere – participate in reproducing inequalities, sometimes intentionally but also – most often and most problematically – when not ‘consciously’ intending to do so (but doing so all the same). The specific orientation of critical privilege studies reveals how normalization reproduces – while concealing – the power relations and structural logics of dominant–subordinate relations, and how behaving ‘normally’ in unequal systems reinforces and reproduces their hierarchies, whether intentionally or not. Critical privilege studies clarifies how privilege works to entrench and amplify systemic inequalities, while enabling those with privilege to be unaware of, habitually ignore, and also deny how privilege tilts the playing field in their favor – a reality that fosters feelings of superiority for some and inferiority for others. And by recognizing that everyone occupies multiple social categories, critical privilege studies uniquely engages the complex dynamics of theorizing intersectionality and points to the inadequacy of critical projects that focus exclusively on a single vector of oppression.

### Being DA

#### Their framework is a form of liberalism that pacifies violence and legitimizes military action creating zones of being and nonbeing

**Van Milders and Toros 20**(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)

Indeed, the ‘international’ nature of IR and of its scholars make the discipline a ‘frontline’ discipline that often resides in practices along the abyssal lines between the zones of being and nonbeing. This is caused by the object of enquiry of the discipline – formally the power relations between states but, as is increasingly recognised, the power relations between people. It is also caused by the practices of the discipline – the need to perform the role and lifestyle of the international expert for research, dissemination and increasingly impact. There are many ways in which this is distributed across the discipline, yet what the iterations of disciplinary violence in IR tend to have in common is a further proliferation of the limits of IR as essentially an abyssal line. This concerns, for instance, the decadent or disciplinary nature of mainstream IR, widely critiqued elsewhere (such as in Ashley and Walker, 1990 and Weber, 2014 to name but two separated by decades). However, critical strands of IR theory might have, despite their efficacy at exposing the violence performed by mainstream IR, implicitly (and presumably undeliberately) contributed to the image of the critical theorist as an expert or intellectual, characterised by the privilege to withdraw politically and theorise both systemically as well as globally (Linklater, 1996). This image subsequently solicits and naturalises a range of theoretical inquiries that not only stem from the zone of being but also, as mentioned above, continue to demarcate an abyssal line around the discipline. This has, in recent years, allowed for the continued support for Western military violence in post-colonial states, even when such instances have had disastrous effects (see debate between Dunne and Gelber, 2014, Hehir, 2015, and again Dunne and Gelber, 2015 as well as the critique of feminist support for war in Afghanistan in Wibben, 2011). The violent nature of IR is also evident from its inclusion of non-Western forms of theory (typically presented as reactionary and anti-Western) on the premise that they do not challenge the discipline’s inherently Western epistemology (Buzan, 2018). The violence of IR theory is then characterised by its capacity and often willingness to maintain relations of both material as well as epistemic coloniality. This article is not about pointing accusatory fingers at specific instances of disciplinary and epistemic violence, which would indeed aid to exceptionalise said violence. Yet the question remains: what marks the violence of IR that cannot be solely attributed to the fact that it is a discipline like any other, and can we study IR without reproducing said violence? To clarify, the type of violence we are talking about is not merely the direct violence of physical and material force or the indirect violence of the aggregate actions of social groups or institutions, such as a refugee crisis or the concentration of wealth. Rather, it is the violence of pacification: a form of domination that (re)structures the political order and ensures that violent resistance against it is infrequent (Baron et al., 2019: 203). The violence of pacification is often inconspicuous, yet it operates through means of coercion that are rendered visible whenever they are resisted. As such, it is similar to Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of the maintaining function of objective violence in capitalist ideology that incites the eruption of subjective violence of anti-capitalist struggles and riots (2009). In IR, this pacification is distributed through the so-called liberal world order, often celebrated for bestowing the world with liberal peace and a decline of violence (Ikenberry, 2009; Pinker, 2012). Yet liberal pacification is still violent, as ‘it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and inter-state wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence’ (Baron et al., 2019: 207). As it concerns the shaping and maintaining of a political order that seeks to hide its apparatus of violent coercion, the violence of pacification also intersects with the epistemic violence that is distributed through a colonial epistemology. It is indeed the epistemic violence that seeks to silence marginalised groups such as the subaltern nonspecialists, the illiterate peasantry, and the urban subproletariat (Spivak, 1994). Through IR’s violence, the international is reconfigured into a discipline that silences these voices in a seemingly non-violent way by subjugating their experiences as in need of translation or assimilation into expert knowledge that can be evaluated against disciplining/disciplinary criteria, that is, impact. So as opposed to trivilialising IR’s violence by exceptionalising it, we rather seek to highlight the deeply embedded nature of this violence across the discipline, although of course distributed to varying degrees.

### AT: Evaluating Scholarship Bad

#### Their evidence is the product of the system that encouraged it---methodological whiteness is unquestionably accepted as the true logic of security studies, creating a never-ending cycle of securitization and threat construction

**Gani and Marshal** **22**(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)

If academia has had a long history of supplying imperial policy through its knowledge production, the reverse has also been true—it is not a unidirectional process. Thus, imperial policies and those that embed racial injustices have often provided the starting-point for academic enquiry, with imperialist and racist constructions taken as the material reality from which to launch any research, without historicization or interrogation of whether that is how it has to be. The risk of academia being a mule for unjust and oppressive assumptions generated through colonial and racist practice looms even larger with the increased emphasis in academia on the necessity of applying for and obtaining research grants. Many funding bodies are dependent on state subsidies, or are financed by the corporate sector or by benefactors from the business and political elite.27 When it comes to selecting prize-winners, the committees are often made up of members from the business community to assess the potential ‘real world’ (and presumably monetary) impact of the proposed research. Thus academia is not a bastion of intellectual autonomy, but is increasingly allowing the parameters and goals of research to be delineated by practitioners and their priorities. Where those practitioners have vested interests (as is often likely, even if not always the case) in a social, economic and political status quo that upholds systemic discrimination against marginalized communities, the potential for deep-rooted long-term change becomes muted. This special issue accordingly demonstrates how academic knowledge production risks reifying colonial and racial injustices. Like so-called impartial reporting in journalism, which indirectly becomes a convenient and efficient means for political elites to distribute their messages, IR as a discipline can end up being a disseminator of the rationales and motives of policy-makers. Thus the supposed neutrality of analytical theorizing and empiricism,28 which claim merely to observe and predict impartially the way the world is and will be without problematization, can be seen as complicit in normalizing what should in fact be treated as abnormal, even unacceptable. Several contributions apply this argument to particular regions and debates where the inherent absorption of unjust practices and erasures within knowledge production is particularly egregious. The articles by Kwaku Danso and Kwesi Aning, and by Somdeep Sen, both call for greater challenges to the centrality of the state in IR, and criticize the way it has mirrored an (often colonial) international practice of delegitimizing non-state actors. In their article, Danso and Aning complicate Weberian notions of the state monopoly on violence, extending validity and recognition to non-state actors in their ability to act as authoritative avenues for dispute resolution.29 They further make the case for the unsettling of knowledge within security studies, especially when engaging with the African continent, arguing that methodological whiteness has been unquestioningly accepted as the logic that underpins much of security studies discourse. This lack of problematization racializes Africa as ungovernable, and flattens or often entirely negates any substantive understandings of the complexities of lived experiences.30 Their article also makes visible the ways in which academic eagerness to supply regional case-studies for the sake of policy relevance and proof of ‘universal theories’ impact people’s lived realities. They make their point explicit through an illustration of the ‘war on terror’ discourses within the Sahel region. Providing an alternative example, Sen argues that academic scholarship has contributed to the concretization of the state and its violence as ‘normal politics’, while insurgency (or, in other words, anti-colonial resistance) is thereby rendered ‘unnatural’ and existentially dangerous for global order.31 In failing to question the sanctity of the state, scholars have been complicit in upholding colonial practice and the outlawing of resistance, consigning it beyond the realm of acceptable politics, as seen in contexts such as Palestine. Sharri Plonski and Nivi Manchanda extend these arguments about unsettling the fixity of the state and its borders, but also expand where we look to first to identify the producers of knowledge.32 Thus, they argue knowledge is not necessarily always produced within the academy, but often is first made (and indeed exchanged and concretized) through (colonial) practice and, in turn, via normalization that converts the practice into ‘fact’ that goes unchallenged by academic knowledge producers. Their article demonstrates the way colonial and racist knowledges are nourished, upheld and validated by silences within broader epistemic communities—communities in which the boundaries between academics, policy-makers and corporations are much more fluid than a strict binary between academics and practitioners. Recognizing this fluidity also serves to disrupt the ‘bridge the gap’ debate discussed at the outset of this article.

## ALT

### Alt---Post-Racist Critical IR

#### Vote negative for post-racist critical IR scholarship – revealing the Westphilian epistemologies present in the aff is critical to holding them accountable for their double standards and working towards decolonization

**Hobson 07**(John, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, “Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR”, CS)

If Eurocentrism portrays the West as bringing the world to heel, post-racist emancipatory politics seeks to bring the world to heal. How, then, might we begin to imagine this? Post-racist IR singles out analyses of identity-formation and civilisational dialogues/dialectics as the first port of call for a global emancipatory politics. The centre-piece of racism as it has been constructed in the West is a repressing of the Other in the Self. It is precisely this that underpins the Eurocentric construction of a line of civilisational apartheid, which creates the illusion of a pure, self-generating, supremacist White Western Self. Accepting the Other in the Self and recognising that the Self is therefore hybrid must be central to the process of global reconciliation. The second step is, however, much more fraught but all the more pressing nevertheless – namely the creation of a political dialogue between East and West.100 This can take the form of a counter-hegemonic bloc comprising a rainbow coalition of groups from the West though mainly from the East, which can articulate an alternative discourse to challenge Eurocentric post-racism. Still, there are undoubtedly many hurdles that stand in its way. These include the not inconsiderable spiritual capital that Westerners have invested in their Eurocentric identity; the economic interests of capital in maintaining post-racist neo-colonialism; and, ironically, those Eastern political elites who embrace Eurocentrism in order to hold on to power. But global reconciliation need not be portrayed as an impossible dawn, for there is historical precedent here in the shape of the Eastern nationalist movements that successfully challenged the discourse of empire. And while decolonisation has been succeeded by the imposition of post-racist policies this should not detract from the success of Eastern resistance agency in terminating formal empire. Decolonisation also provides a crucial precedent given that ‘the setting of the sun on the British empire’ was always portrayed by the British elites as an impossible dusk. Salutary too is that Nelson Mandela’s long walk to freedom would also have appeared prior to its success as a feat too far. Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney argue that this political dialogue needs to work on an empathic approach in which both sides appeal to their own experiences of suffering.101 This needs to be coupled with a major injection of humility in the West, which can be enabled by revealing, and facing up to, the massive moral debt that it owes the East (given that the East did so much to enable the West’s rise through both dialogue and sacrifice). In any case, failure to do this is to be complicit with that which went on not just in the past but also in the last fifty years. But alongside these rhetorical manoeuvres, the Eastern and Western spokespersons need to emphasise the contradictions and double standards that underpin contemporary post-racist Western foreign policy. Here they need to engage not simply in dialogue but a dialogical dialectic wherein the East prosecutes the unfair and hypocritical practices of the post-racist West in what might be called the ‘global court of social justice’. This is not a legal entity, though it is governed like any (formal) court by a certain set of (social) norms that adjudicate over what is right and wrong. The nationalist movements effectively prosecuted the West in the global court of social justice through ‘mimetic challenge’,102 or ‘rhetorical entrapment’,103 where they rendered empire illegitimate by appealing to Western social norms of justice, since there was no other way of revealing the racist double standards that the West committed in its imperial policies (much as the Black Jacobins had done in the earlier Haitian revolution).104 Crucially, if revealing the racism of empire had such powerful import in effecting decolonisation, then why cannot the strategy of revealing post-racism today equally be used to decolonise contemporary neo-colonialism? Thus a counter-hegemonic bloc needs to work within the interstices of Western discourse to reveal the postracist contradictions and double standards that it consciously and subconsciously smoothes over, in order to demonstrate how the West currently fails to uphold its own self-referential norms of human justice. Appealing only to Eastern norms would most likely be rejected out of hand by the West with no progress forward possible. Indeed, ‘[f]or the oppressed it is a strategic necessity to address the oppressor in its own language, the language which it knows and understands: indeed the point is to manipulate the self-understanding of the oppressor’.105 Besides, no court can operate according to conflicting norms. And it is to the West that the East must turn if only because it currently holds disproportionate (though not anthropomorphic) power. Still, this dialogical project is one that can simultaneously benefit the West.106 For as noted, Eurocentrism leads to the repression and sublimation of the Other in the Self. Thus doing away with Eurocentrism can end the sociopsychological angst and alienation that necessarily occurs through such sublimation. Indeed, the ultimate irony is that racist/post-racist Western imperialism has underdeveloped the Western Self. And so, hopes for Western emancipation must to an important extent lie with the ‘Eastern civilising mission’ and the associated ‘Black Human’s Burden’, which can launch the Western peoples on an ethnographic maiden Voyage of Self-discovery that, with humility, empathy and above all sincerity, steers around the icebergs of tragic self-deception to return fully humanised. In the process, we take one giant leap towards a global dream that exorcises the global nightmare of cycles of war and Western civilising missions – a dream in which the dusk of post-racism brings in its wake the dawn of a new era wherein the peoples of the world can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate together as equal partners.

### Alt---Insignificant Acts of Resistance

#### Vote neg to further insignificant acts of resistance---slowly putting cracks into the regime is the only way we can successfully challenge it

**Van Milders and Toros 20**(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)

What we are more interested in here is how we can challenge the violence of the zone of being, our violence. Thus, what we aim to explore is how to remain ‘in’– in Mogadishu, in rooms with Western military and defence officials – while refraining (as far as possible) from participating in structural and epistemic violence, and indeed challenging it. Such a staying ‘in’ would allow critical IR scholars to uncover the fissures (Horkheimer, 1982) that exist in all structures of violence, and attempt to expose them and enlarge them. Before elaborating on this, it is important to point out that such an attempt is not rooted in the belief that we can find a path towards a completely ethical future in IR scholarship. Just as we argue that there is no ethical past to ground ourselves in – on the contrary, there is only a violent past – we are not contemplating the possibility of an ethical future free of tensions and violence. Such a stance is not of the purview of critical scholars, as it is inevitably based in the misrecognition of violences that always mark – to some degree – human social relations. Our aim is far more modest and thus hopefully more honest in that it seeks a path of discomfort that is ethical enough to allow for an engagement with today’s power structures, which we continue to insist are in need of critique and countering, also from within. Drawing some foundations from research on the everyday and the banal, we want to argue in favour of almost insignificant acts of subversion in the zones of being. These are acts that are so small that, for example, they cannot be used as a reason to exclude scholars from a gathering or even indeed to refrain from re-inviting them. They are almost insignificant. It is in the almost however that we seek ethical moments that have the potential to highlight and enlarge the fissures of violent power structures. Just as banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) can be ‘significant and political’ and instances of 'everyday peace’ and 'everyday resistance’ can be generative (Mac Ginty, 2014: 552; Vinthagen, 2015), almost insignificant acts of subversion can, we argue, be disruptive and generative. Such acts can take a variety of forms and, just as everyday peace, they 'probably cannot be modelled, taught or replicated’ (Mac Ginty, 2014: 554). They are available in the immediate and only exist contextually. They differ from the concept of the 'everyday’ insofar as the term has been used in IR to mean practices that are of the 'realm of the routine and humdrum which we take for granted’ (Holloway and Hubbard, 2001: 33). Our acts of subversion are just the opposite: They are precisely those conscious acts of agency that may be disguised within the routine and humdrum but that in fact aim to challenge and subvert it. They recognise our position as agents, our being internationals and use this position to authorise these minute acts that challenge our exclusive right to be. Methodologically, they operate like a crack – ‘the perfect ordinary creation of a space or moment in which we assert a different type of doing’ (Holloway, 2010: 21). What this means in terms of practices is not obvious and all we can put forward here is a discussion that is aimed at clarifying our argument rather than offer an exhaustive list of what they may entail. As such, we identify three forms of almost insignificant acts of subversion that acknowledge the position from which the enunciation takes place: (a) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, highlights the other as different but equal; (b) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, explicitly speaks out the power disparity and violence of a relationship; and (c) moments in which one implicitly recognises and, if appropriate, explicitly highlights the violence of power structures generally made invisible through habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). As with everyday peace, such subversion ‘is not something that people always and necessarily engage in. It relies on opportunities and context, as well as the ability of individuals and groups to exploit these’ (Mac Ginty, 2014: 550). Context – the power structures surrounding the individual and the latter’s capital within those structures – will be central to an actor’s ability to engage in such acts and to what degree.

### AT: IR Isn’t Intrinsically Racist

#### The historical record goes neg.

**Lake et al. 21**(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)

The critique of IR’s race blindness begins with the Howard School. The tradition of unveiling the modern world from its racialized origins was proffered by Howard University–based African American IR scholars beginning in the late nineteenth century (Henderson 2013, 2017; Vitalis2015). Arguably path-breaking, the contributions associated with the Howard School highlight IR’s systematic failure to appreciate race and its inscription into world order. Silence about racism in IR, imposed in part by the exclusion of work that advanced its critique (Vitalis 2000), obscured race as an orienting worldview in the emergent field. Despite various adaptations of publications like Foreign Affairs—which had been titled the Journal of Race Development from 1910 to 1919—its genealogy implies what early scholars deemed the subject of IR to be. This veneer of substantive change in the discipline was counterpoised by W.E.B. Du Bois’s seminal thesis on the color line, first offered in The Souls of Black Folk[2015 (1903)] and later extended in “The Color Line Belts the World” (1906). Du Bois noted, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the Color Line” [2005 (1906), p. 33]. For Du Bois, White supremacy and anti-Blackness were organizing principles of US expansionism. Similarly, other scholars of the Howard School made plain that theorizing the international required careful scrutiny of its imperial, colonial, and neocolonial foundations [Locke 1992 (1916), Bunche 1936, Tate (1943)]. Notwithstanding, mid-century debates in the field over stability, dependency, and territorial sovereignty were underpinned with racial ontologies, willful or otherwise, that privileged Whiteness in their assumptions about the social world (Vucetic 2016).This early critique of IR’s race blindness was elaborated in opposition to the incipient field’s essentialist notions of race. For Alain Locke and Ralph Bunche, race was what today we recognize as a social construct based on phenotypic characteristics that are themselves socially constructed. By advancing this argument, Locke and Bunche removed race from its biological and anthropological moorings, effectively rejecting the “hierarchy of races” assumption that anchored the developing field of IR (Henderson 2013). Locke’s [1992 (1916)] sociological thesis of race as a product occulture informed Bunche’s (1936) subsequent analysis in A World View of Race. For Bunche, race was arbitrary. Devoid of any scientific meaning, race was a device of national policy that shaped bargaining in class conflict. The Howard School also anticipated much of the postwar scholarship on race and racism in IR. To be sure, it developed some of the earliest theory of modern war as an outcome of imperialist and other racial projects (Du Bois 1915, Tate 1943, Bunche 1936), a point delivered in Henderson’s (2017) critique of Vitalis’s (2015) apparent disassociation of these scholars from the formulation of IR theory. Though met with scant regard, the insights developed by the Howard School unveil an IR that not only noticed race but also highlighted it as a prominent axis of inquiry and theory building. The norm against noticing has since been engaged by scholars, and this confrontation actively informs the present debate. Across interlocking approaches to the study of race, new scholarship coheres around the assertion that race and racism are unavoidable when grappling with the is-sues and methodologies of IR (Persaud & Walker 2000; Shilliam 2013, 2020b). The norm against noticing has been challenged by excavating disciplinary genealogies and unveiling forms of racialization as power in IR. Burgeoning literature on Eurocentrism (Hobson 2012) and new advances in non-Western IR theory, embodied by the “Global IR” project (Acharya & Buzan 2009, Haggard& Kang 2020), similarly examine the imperial conditions that constitute relations between the European “core” and the non-White “peripheries.” Recent contributions in the field also illuminate the racial and gendered patterns of IR canon formation. In a recent essay, for instance, Hutchings & Owens (2021) expose opportunities to theorize race in IR through a fundamental reorientation toward the international thought of women (of color).

### AT: IR=Redeemable

#### The alt is a prerequisite to ethical IR scholarship – discomfort is necessary to deter institutions from employing the politics of denial

**Vitalis 2K**(Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations”, CS)

Once, after I presented an account of the Saudi case, a colleague asked: ‘why do you seem surprised by any of this, what did you expect?’ This question tells us something about how the Cold War ‘norm against noticing’, the ‘graceful and generous liberal gesture’ proceeds, what it presumes. Race is already known, banal and commonplace, not worth noticing. Race is ‘really’ something else. Race is a ‘language that most would today find offensive and inappropriate’. This last statement sums up how the best history we have to date of the discipline of IR, Political Discourse of Anarchy, by Brian Schmidt, deals with the most significant force in American politics and culture. Schmidt dismisses in a single sentence in a self-styled discursive history what was known at the time to be basic to understanding world politics, the ‘conflict of color’.89 More recently, a colleague politely pressed me to name a single work by the towering intellect of the twentieth century that was significant for any aspect of IR. This form of question is a well-known reflex that is triggered when canons of seemingly timeless truths come under interrogation. But the truth is that ‘African Roots of War’, Du Bois’ bold attempt to theorise on imperialism and global conflict, which his biographer Levering Lewis calls ‘one of the analytical triumphs of the early twentieth century’, has never been anthologised or discussed in any IR theory text in the US.90 While ‘African Roots’ was celebrated then, and Du Bois lectured widely to black and white audiences at home and abroad on the topic, we are much more likely now to reference white writers—E.D. Morel’s Africa and the Peace of Europe, and especially, Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism—when creating our genealogies and canons of anti-imperialism and ‘radical’ theory traditions in world politics. Lord Zimmern, in contrast to Du Bois, is almost always included in one story IR tells about World War I and its putative impact on the emerging discipline in Great Britain and the US.91 But the transcripts of Lord Zimmern’s deeply rooted, extended, and quite serious conversations with his many colleagues about race as a fundamental part of world order, ‘the most urgent problem of our time’, inevitably go unreported, and so the questions they raise for Zimmern’s successors remain unresolved. The first post-war generation of émigré theorists was equally successful in mythmaking of its own. They created a world where realist thought in its classic geopolitical mode is a coherent and continuous tradition across space and time. Today’s national security debates and self-serving ‘strategic justifications’ are represented as the close echoes of earlier debates inside imperial states and societies. At key moments, the promotion of civilisation, greatness, and modernity (or, now, democracy and market economies), the preservation of a hegemon’s credibility, and other expansionist credos trump the arguments of those who really understand the true strategic or security value inhering in one course over that of another. Old metaphors are compared with new ones, for instance, a row of falling dominoes, a barrel contaminated by one rotten apple, and the like.92 Representatives of the American geopolitics tradition, such as Ellsworth Huntington and Alfred Thayer Mahan, can be summoned and selectively quoted without ever acknowledging their concern with the world racial balance of power that launched the quest for a whitewater Navy as defence against the teeming Asian multitudes who threatened from land and sea.93 It is in the forgotten, yet vast literature and the terms of the ongoing public debate on ‘race war’ that we can trace the roots of what is later recast as an American realist tradition in IR theory. We have to acknowledge, nonetheless, that the collectivity that identifies itself as ‘the field of International Relations’ in the US is tightly, organically bound to a particular place, history, and social formation.94 This inescapable fact, which applies equally across ‘schools’ of thought and methodological ‘approaches’, goes far to explain why IR today has little to say about racism as an international institution or white supremacy as the identity of the American state that the field’s founders embraced and elaborated. Certainly, this problematique would provide a better explanation than one that would simply erase racism from the historical record else deny its importance. It would place the post-Holocaust, post-World War II invention of realism as a tradition that argues against the explanatory significance of ideas (and morality) in world politics in a new and disturbing light. Critical alternatives need to be elaborated in opposition to the ‘norm against noticing’ and to the wider so-called ‘realist’ strains in American life (defined against hopelessly utopian visions about ‘ending war’ or ‘transcending capitalism’) that, without a hint of irony, insist that a ‘colour blind’ society is now within easy reach.95 Such are the terms today in which privilege is defended and hierarchy reconstituted. The embeddedness of writers and readers in a particular cultural formation is inescapable. But so too is the work of ‘clearing intellectual and moral space’ in this particular part of the increasingly globalised academy: Racial constructs are being forced to reveal their struts and bolts, their technology and their carapace, so that political action, legal and social thought, and cultural production can be generated sans racist cant, explicit or in disguise.96 Political Science, like other institutions, is constituted and regulated by a set of norms and armoured by a repertoire of material awards and sanctions that can affect the likelihood that members of the profession themselves will pursue the work that Toni Morrison writes about in ‘Home’.97 My interest in writing on racism is the chance that it offers to imagine what can be done to make it less easy and less safe for others to practice the politics of its denial.

### AT: No Spill Up

#### Yes spill out. This is not simply ivory tower theorizing---academia spills out, shaking the foundation for racialized IR

**Gani and Marshal** **22**(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)

First, as a number of the contributions argue,15 academia has been a predominant influence in the production of broad epistemic communities. In the course of this process, academic knowledge production has acted as a supplier of racial, civilizational and imperialist discourse, ideology and ‘logic’ that were (and are) disseminated through research, teaching and broader public intellectualism. Bearing in mind that many policy-makers have been taught and trained within academia, especially elite institutions, it is necessary to recall that IR departments were founded in the early twentieth century in the United Kingdom and United States precisely to serve the purpose of informing imperial administrations.16 While this form of transmission is impossible to quantify precisely, the articles in this special issue show that nevertheless universities, along with think tanks and journals, delineated the parameters of rational and acceptable debate. That the ideas emanated (as they still do) from so-called bastions of scholarship and rigour meant they carried greater credibility and gravitas, and were accompanied by an assumption that they had been scientifically tested. In many cases universities and intellectuals were responsible for upholding the legitimacy of racist hierarchies and the necessity of colonialism in the West against the grain of anti-colonial and anti-racist social movements and intellectuals in the colonies, and subsequent grassroots movements for the abolition of colonialism and racism in the West. Thus, in contrast to the common refrain that academia is an ‘ivory tower’ that is disconnected from the real world, in IR it has in fact routinely demonstrated the opposite, with the capacity to embed and systematize racism, scavenging the disorganized and reactionary fears of society and refining them in such a way that they appear rational,17 indeed necessary for the sake of order, security and communal peace. A second way in which academia has historically fed and continues to feed policy is in a more direct way—through a supply chain of academically trained experts who go on to work in policy, either as consultants or by holding office in government or in other state institutions such as the military. This pattern was laid down during the peak period of European colonialism, the clearest example being provided by J. S. Mill: despite being a philosopher, he was anything but detached from the ‘real world’, taking up the position of colonial officer in British-controlled India, arguing against Indian self-rule on the racist intellectual basis that the natives were still in their infancy.18 Such ‘knowledge entrepreneurs’ were at the forefront of the knowledge ordering indispensable to Britain’s expansion into south Asia. These ‘epistemological invasions’, alongside the core group of ‘European explorers, diplomats, military men, and Company officials’, had the chief function of producing ‘a proto-episteme’ or ‘corpus of knowledge’ by which the region was rendered legible for imperial expansion.19 Later, the urgent imperatives of war established the revolving door that turned scholars into practitioners and vice versa, as witnessed, for example, in the interplay in 1930s British East Africa between colonial administrations and anthropologists to ensure indirect rule.20 But such close embodied relationships between academics and imperial governance were not confined to the age of formal empires. The scholarly sanitizing and rebranding of contemporary imperialism as ‘hegemony’ or ‘soft power’ prevents us from applying anti-colonial critiques to contemporary empires. In his contribution to the special issue, Randolph Persaud argues that this is a complicity especially epitomized by US ‘Disciplinary IR’, and challenges the feigning of neutrality in US-led theorizing, calling for it to be recognized as implicitly ideological.21 Moreover, it is precisely their ideological character that renders such academics ‘useful’ and allows them to move smoothly into policy roles. Thus, for Persaud, their service as practitioners acts as the chief conduit for those ideologies to travel into and be socialized in policy. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Barack Obama, and Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice, are just some of the examples of academics who have served in high office in the United States. The notion that academic expertise might temper imprudence and propensity for war in policy-making is refuted by their respective willingness to approve of foreign occupations, military intervention, coups, drone attacks or authoritarian allies abroad, and of racial securitization, border regimes and incarceration at home. As Persaud points out, beyond those holding office there are multiple examples of academics who have acted as advisers to governments, obliquely upholding the principles of imperialism under the guise of ‘grand strategy’ or the ‘liberal international order’.

### AT: Perm

#### Silencing DA: The perm reinforces the “norm against noticing.”

**Henderson 13**(Errol, Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory”, CS)

In fact, the ‘norm against noticing’ white racism is so intense that it engenders a ‘silencing’ of those who would raise it; or it ensures against publication in mainstream outlets for such work except that authors provide appropriate euphemisms for the atrocities associated with white racism—especially against blacks—or they provide the requisite ‘balance’ to emphasize the role of nonwhites in their own subjugation—as if white supremacism and the imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and internal colonialism that it has employed against Africans, Asians, and Native Americans are somehow the responsibility of groups other than the whites who created, maintained and continue to profit from them. Thus, the racist dualism in world politics creates, in turn, a dual quandary for IR scholars and many Africanists seeking to publish in Western journals—and many non-Western ones, too—wherein white racist expectations of the appropriateness of certain lines of inquiry often limit the discourse of African politics to hollow phraseology and meaningless metaphors, while they simultaneously check informed challenges to historical and contemporary expressions, practices and institutions of white racism in academia by ensuring that such racism is rarely confronted in the major publications in IR/world politics in clear and direct terms. Another result is that the norm against noticing white racism leaves IR scholars teaching a history of the development of IR which ignores the salience of colonialism as central to the origins of the field. That is, in continuing to teach the fiction that the field emerged following the devastation of World War I as ‘idealists’ led by Wilson and others such as Lowes Dickinson, Zimmern, Giddings and Kerr sought to provide the institutional checks on the realpolitik that was implicated in the ‘war to end all wars’, we belie the reality of the centrality of colonialism, race development and white racial supremacy to the development of the academic field of IR. Thus, our narrative creates an academic fiction that hovers outside of its own history. The presence of this narrative is a testament to the white supremacism that is a centrepiece of the field given its role in ensuring a ‘norm against noticing’ the centrality of white racism in world politics. It simultaneously silences or marginalizes perspectives that focus on the importance of white racism in the development of the field of IR/world politics, and similarly, those who would raise this as a legitimate research focus for the most sensible of reasons: it happens to be true.

#### Substitution DA: The alt is mutually exclusive and a sequencing question. Critical interrogation should be independent of policy focus.

**Chandler and Chipato 21**(David, Professor of International Relations at University of Westminster, UK, Farai, PhD in Political Science from Queen Mary University of London, “A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies”, CS)

The problem with this move of displacement is that the ethico-political stance of reparation is necessarily an affirmative one. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003: 150–151) suggests, it is through this displacement that we can learn from the ‘ways selves and communities succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture – even of a culture whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain them’. As Tiffany Lethabo King powerfully argues, while it is the case that reading ‘for what is generative and provides openings’ (King, 2019: 230n74) is vital for coalition and collaboration, reparative work advocated in LGBT and queer theory presupposes the positionality of a shared humanist sexual subject position. As Fred Moten (2018: 11–12) notes in his essay on race and the work of Levinas, the reparative stance of being ‘open to the world’ or ‘available to the world’ can only work as a critical project for those for whom the world is accessible in these ways. For those structurally excluded from this political ontology of the subject, this openness would be critical only insofar as relationality is understood to be an expression of power, structured by the givenness of a transcendental subjectivity that the black cannot have but by which the black can be had; a structural position that he or she cannot take but by which he or she can be taken. (Moten, 2018: 204) Any project of reparative work for generative ethico-political openings would have to be undertaken after the abolition or dismantling of critical security studies, not as a substitute for this, displacing the problem to that of the repair of the disciplinary field. Reparative work proffered from within a system where race is not merely the ‘oil’ in the engine but the engine itself offers little hope of real change. How can critical security studies offer a space for a new antiracist political ethics, from within the wider ‘prison of colonial modernity’ (Blaney and Tickner, 2017)? Surely, if reparative work is to be undertaken, it should be carried out on the terms of those who are wronged, rather than on the grounds of the perpetrator of the offence. If critical security studies exists on the ground of the ‘human’, as a science of the humanity from which Blackness has always been excluded, then it cannot ameliorate the oppression that was required to clear that ground (Wynter, 2003). Instead, we might follow Alexander Weheliye (2014: 137) in arguing that humanity, the idea of the ‘human’, can only be overhauled from without, transformed by those who, he argues, ‘live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception’. Thus, we might argue that reparation ultimately leads us back to subjection (see Coulthard, 2007: 453). ‘Questions of race and racism’ are not the spectre haunting critical security studies, they are its life blood, its arteries and the muscles that power it. Critical security studies can have no reparative access to ‘questions of race and racism’ no matter how hard or how genuinely it tries. ‘Questions of race and racism’ are what enable the cuts and binaries, the world, the subjects, the concerns, the practices, the methods, the understandings of critical security studies. Critical. Security. Studies. What is it about these three words, singularly, together, in whatever order, that could make anyone think, in today’s world, there was a way beyond their imbrications in ‘questions of race and racism’? Critical of what? On what grounds? Security of what? On what grounds? Study of what? On what grounds? Answer: the grounds of anti-Blackness or ‘questions of race and racism’.

#### Resistance DA: Modern IR theory was created to ensure that resistance is ontologically impossible---the only critiques that they allow are those that uphold the current system

**Van Milders and Toros 20**(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)

This has also left a mark on the dynamics of knowledge production. Our conceptualisation of ‘the other side of the line’ is always determined by Western epistemology’s abyssal thinking, that is, the colonial matrix of knowledge production (Santos, 2007). In other words, this messy cartography is predicated on the assumption that those within the zone of nonbeing cannot speak or think (Spivak, 1994). The hierarchy between rational, objective and universal knowledge and irrational, subjective and particular experience continues to operate through Orientalist conceptions about who knows and who is known or who produces knowledge and who produces experience. In short, the violence of colonial difference constitutes the Western, academic knowledge worker, whether they work strictly within disciplinary boundaries or an interdisciplinary fashion. And this brings us to the second question: what does this mean for knowledge production in IR? Here we point to the ontological gap between knowledge and experience that has recently been articulated as a critique of the role of the expert as an Orientalist subject (Kynsilehto and Puumala, 2015; Sylvester, 2011, 2012, 2013). Indeed, the ‘international’ nature of IR and of its scholars make the discipline a ‘frontline’ discipline that often resides in practices along the abyssal lines between the zones of being and nonbeing. This is caused by the object of enquiry of the discipline – formally the power relations between states but, as is increasingly recognised, the power relations between people. It is also caused by the practices of the discipline – the need to perform the role and lifestyle of the international expert for research, dissemination and increasingly impact. There are many ways in which this is distributed across the discipline, yet what the iterations of disciplinary violence in IR tend to have in common is a further proliferation of the limits of IR as essentially an abyssal line. This concerns, for instance, the decadent or disciplinary nature of mainstream IR, widely critiqued elsewhere (such as in Ashley and Walker, 1990 and Weber, 2014 to name but two separated by decades). However, critical strands of IR theory might have, despite their efficacy at exposing the violence performed by mainstream IR, implicitly (and presumably undeliberately) contributed to the image of the critical theorist as an expert or intellectual, characterised by the privilege to withdraw politically and theorise both systemically as well as globally (Linklater, 1996). This image subsequently solicits and naturalises a range of theoretical inquiries that not only stem from the zone of being but also, as mentioned above, continue to demarcate an abyssal line around the discipline. This has, in recent years, allowed for the continued support for Western military violence in post-colonial states, even when such instances have had disastrous effects (see debate between Dunne and Gelber, 2014, Hehir, 2015, and again Dunne and Gelber, 2015 as well as the critique of feminist support for war in Afghanistan in Wibben, 2011). The violent nature of IR is also evident from its inclusion of non-Western forms of theory (typically presented as reactionary and anti-Western) on the premise that they do not challenge the discipline’s inherently Western epistemology (Buzan, 2018). The violence of IR theory is then characterised by its capacity and often willingness to maintain relations of both material as well as epistemic coloniality.

### AT: Perm Do The Aff Through The Lens

#### Trivializing race in IR as the background to “important” security policies only serves to further cement racism in the system

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit 20**(Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Melanie, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory, “Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School”, CS)

This article has illustrated that classic securitization theory is structured not only by Eurocentrism, but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. This is evident in its conception of politics, borrowed from Arendt, which it defines as a sphere of (white) civilized dialogue where reason triumphs over irrational securitizations. This perspective is only made possible by ignoring colonial history, ongoing (settler-)colonial relations, and the racial violence of normal liberal politics. Securitization theory’s racism is also evident in its methodology, which examines securitizing speech acts in order to defend this (European, civilized) ‘normal politics’. Under cover of ostensibly neutral terms, securitization normatively prioritizes the defense of order over justice, positioning the securitization theorist as the defender of (white) civilized politics against (racialized) ‘primal anarchy’. We have further demonstrated the role of antiblack thought in securitization theory: its racist imaginaries of Africa serve as an indispensable foil, setting up a contrast between normal politics and securitization. One question beyond the scope of this article is whether this is similarly true of ‘second-generation’ and more empirical applications of securitization theory – or, indeed, the mere use of the word ‘securitization’. Postcolonial literature has long deliberated whether it is possible to rework theories built on racist precepts. For example, vigorous debate has surrounded whether the works of Marx (Coulthard, 2014; Rao, 2017; Robinson, 1983) or Foucault (Mbembe, 2003; Stoler, 1995; Thobani, 2007) can be adapted and made to work for anti-racist/anti-colonial purposes. Are there ‘reparative possibilities’ (Sedgwick, 1997; in relation to international relations, see Rao, 2017) for classic securitization theory? Can it excise or surmount its racist foundations? Our analysis suggests that securitization theory’s racism is not an incidental feature, nor ‘merely’ a matter of (empirical) application. Rather, it is baked into securitization theory’s conceptual apparatus and, in particular, its core concepts of politics and security. These problems cannot be remedied by applying classic securitization theory to non-Western spaces (as typically suggested by critics of its Eurocentrism), or by simply adding race or colonialism to its accounts. The retention of securitization theory’s concepts and methods leads to a primary focus on instances of overtly racist speech acts. Global racism is then treated as a matter of mere language. This elides the constitutive role of racist and colonial relations of force and expropriation in the making of the modern order, including ongoing security projects (see Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019). Once classic securitization theory is stripped of its racist conceptual and methodological apparatus, including its concepts of ‘normal politics’, its conservative deployment of speech act theory, its view of excessive securitization as threatening a racially encoded lower level of civilization, its faith in the social contract, and so on, there is very little left. Perhaps what remains is simply the word ‘securitization’. But even this word is potentially problematic, because inherent in it is a temporal move from normal politics towards the (exceptional) violence of security. Authors attempting to recuperate the term ‘securitization’ must take care not to indulge in white nostalgia for a better, more innocent time: a time that does not exist for those who have been subject to colonialism or the racial contract on scales from the local to the global – that is to say, the majority of the world’s people. Such a recuperative intellectual project, if at all possible, has yet to be articulated.

## Aff

Many more aff answers (defenses of realist/liberal/western IR scholarship) can be found across other camp files, especially the various K answer files put out by the other seniors lab!

### Critiquing Western Scholarship Fails

#### Sweeping critiques of Western colonialism buttress the status quo.

Vickers, 20—Professor of Comparative Education at Kyushu University (Edward, “Critiquing coloniality, ‘epistemic violence’ and western hegemony in comparative education – the dangers of ahistoricism and positionality,” Comparative Education, 56:2, 165-189, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]

The central flaw in the argument advanced by the CER authors stems from an apparent lack of awareness of contemporary scholarship on the comparative history of imperialism and colonialism. Criticism of the Eurocentric assumptions that inform much mainstream social science is certainly warranted, as is critique of the excessive influence exerted by institutions such as key journals based in North America or Europe. However, when critical arguments rely on selective and historically flimsy claims for the uniquely colonial quality of modern Western culture, the risks are twofold: firstly, and fundamentally, actually to sustain or reinforce Eurocentrism by deflecting the critical gaze from non-Western societies and the patterns of oppression (‘colonial’ or otherwise) therein; and secondly, by the same token to weaken or discredit the case for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach to the comparative analysis of education.

The empirical and theoretical flaws of this approach are intertwined with the problematic language in which its arguments are typically couched. Historical and anthropological scholarship on East Asia and other regions amply demonstrates that colonialist or neo-colonialist attitudes and strategies of domination are not and have never been a Western monopoly. But decolonial theory posits the more or less uniform victimhood of non-Western ‘others,’ deriving claims for the moral superiority of ‘authentically’ indigenous perspectives. Debating the validity of such claims is complicated by an emphasis on ‘positionality.’ Readers are exhorted to judge an argument less by standards of evidence or logic (often portrayed as camouflaging a Western ‘will to power’) than on the basis of the writer’s self-identification or ‘positioning.’ The language of ‘epistemic violence,’ ‘secure spaces,’ ‘epistemological diffidence,’ ‘border thinking’ and ‘location’ suggests an image of the critical scholar as revolutionary guerrilla, valiantly sniping at Western hegemony from his or her [their] marginal redoubt. In so far as this reflects a desire for a more just, tolerant and sustainable society – one that values diversity as a resource for mutual learning – it is admirable. However, if we seek to combat oppression, in the educational sphere or beyond, it is incumbent on us to pick our enemies, and our language, carefully. Aiming a blunderbuss at the supposedly illegitimate or self-serving ‘universalism’ of ‘modern Western social science,’ while ignoring how calls for indigenisation and ‘authenticity’ are used to legitimate highly oppressive regimes across Asia and elsewhere, is to risk undermining those universal social and political values (freedom of expression, civil liberties, rule of law) upon which critical scholars themselves rely.

An embrace of ‘opacity’ or ‘epistemological diffidence,’ advocated by several of the CER contributors, threatens to be similarly self-defeating. While they share an admiration for the Argentine theorist of ‘decoloniality,’ Walter Mignolo, the work of his brilliant compatriot, the writer, poet and essayist Jorge Luis Borges, is far worthier of attention. Borges’ famous fondness for ‘labyrinths’ and the paradoxical was combined with a sharp eye for gratuitous obfuscation and circumlocution (see, for example, his story The Aleph, in Borges 1998, 274–286). Offering his own critique of the fashion for opaque jargon in mainstream social science, the émigré Polish sociologist Stanislav Andreski wrote acerbically that ‘one of the pleasures obtainable through recourse to confusion and absurdity is to be able to feel, and publicly to claim, that one knows when in reality one does not’ (1974, 95). ‘Opacity’ in imaginative literature may intrigue or entertain, but in interpreting and explaining unfamiliar societies, cultures and education systems, comparativists especially ought to write in clear, accessible language. And while all social scientists can understand the lure of the sweeping generalisation, we should generalise with extreme caution, especially when categorising large swathes of humanity.

Borges’ earliest collection of stories is entitled A Universal History of Iniquity. This appeared in 1935, when there were already rumblings in both East and West of the conflict that would soon engulf Eurasia. Implied in his title was a truth painfully obvious to many contemporaries: that iniquity is indeed universal. The conflicts of the mid-twentieth century starkly illuminated another truth: that iniquity in the modern world, especially (though not only) that associated with totalitarian societies, often consists in essentialising and de-humanising ‘the other’. Hannah Arendt – a thoroughly Eurocentric thinker, but one who addressed, in ‘totalitarianism,’ a theme with global ramifications – wrote of how, through ‘the murder of the moral person in man,’ totalitarian systems transform their citizens into ‘living corpses’ capable of any outrage (2017, 591). But ironically, in the very act of attacking essentialism as applied to ‘non-Western’ cultures, the CER contributors propagate an essentialised view of ‘the West’ itself. Iniquity in the form of coloniality is in their account attributed solely to Western modernity. This view is both inaccurate and dangerous.

The irony in this approach extends to the attribution of agency. Claims to champion the dignity of subaltern, ‘non-Western’ actors are in fact undermined by assertions of their uniform victimhood. This reproduces the very Eurocentrism that ‘decolonial’ scholars quite rightly seek to challenge. In fact, privilege and victimhood have many dimensions, by no means all traceable to the ‘phenomenon of colossal vagueness’ that is colonialism (Osterhammel 2005, 4). One group or individual can plausibly be portrayed as victim, or perpetrator, or both, depending on context and perspective. Were post-war German civilian refugees from Eastern Europe, or Japanese civilians fleeing Manchuria, victims or perpetrators? Or today, is a privately-educated, English-speaking, upper-caste South Asian scholar more accurately to be seen as privileged or under-privileged, in terms of access to power (‘epistemic’ or otherwise) within South Asia or the global academy? ‘Location’ or identity are not reducible to neat labels or discrete categories. As the Anglo-Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah emphasises, according dignity and agency involves recognising that our identities are not just socially given, but also actively chosen. Culture is ‘a process you join, in living a life with others,’ and ‘the values that European humanists like to espouse belong as much to an African or an Asian who takes them up with enthusiasm as to a European’ (2018, 211). The same applies with respect to value systems we have reason to regard as iniquitous, such as those associated with colonialism or neoliberalism.

What, then, are we to make of the traction that totalising anti-Westernism appears to be gaining within the CIE field? On one level, this may tell us more about the state of campus politics, and politics in general, across contemporary America and the broader ‘Anglosphere’, than about the wider world. The worldview that the CER contributors espouse, even as they strain at the shackles of Western epistemology, is redolent of America’s peculiarly racialised identity politics. And notwithstanding claims to marginal positionality, the increasingly widespread currency of such arguments in North American and Anglophone CIE circles reflects their status as an emergent orthodoxy that in key respects mirrors the very ethnocentrism it rejects.

Although the ideas in the CER special issue are presented as challenging both the scholarly mainstream and a wider neoliberal or neocolonial establishment, the seriousness of this challenge is doubtful. Exhortations to embrace ‘opacity’ or to ‘think otherwise’ in the name of ‘contesting coloniality’ imply no coherent programme, and suggest an overwhelmingly negative agenda. Meanwhile, far from risking ostracism, the contributors can expect warm endorsement of their views from regulars at the major international conferences. For many in the CIE community in North America and beyond, sweeping critiques of Western ‘hegemony’, ‘coloniality’ and so forth hold a strong appeal; it is those seeking to question the balance or accuracy of such theorising who risk opprobrium. As Merquior wrote of Foucault, Derrida and their postmodernist or ‘deconstructivist’ followers, their ‘skepsis’, ‘highly placed in the core institutions of the culture it so strives to undermine,’ has come to constitute an ‘official marginality’ (1991, 160).

The potential – and actual – consequences of this are troubling. Takayama et al call for the WCCES in particular to embrace the agenda of ‘contesting coloniality,’ but one conclusion to be drawn from recent events is that this is already happening, with damaging consequences for civility within the Comparative Education field, and for the wider credibility of its scholarly output.15 Reducing scholarship to the projection of the scholar’s own positionality can only lead to fragmentation and irrelevance. To quote Merquior again (paraphrasing Hilary Putnam), ‘to demote rationality, in a relativist way, to a mere concoction of a given historical culture is as reductionist as the logical positivist’s reduction of reason to scientific calculus’ (160). What he calls the ‘Elixir of Pure Negation’ (159) is an intoxicating brew, but it is unlikely to inspire coherent or constructive contributions to addressing the pressing problems of our age: climate change, poverty, inequality and the ethical crisis that underpins them all.

Indeed, it is very likely to do the opposite. The neoliberal cadres of the OECD or World Bank, along with nationalist autocrats from Beijing to Budapest, will be more than happy for ‘critical scholars’ to fulminate against a vaguely-defined ‘West’ while embracing ‘epistemological diffidence’ (Takayama, Sriprakash, and Connell 2017, S18). As one critic of ‘postmodernism’ has put it, the promotion of ‘epistemological pluralism,’ combined with rejection of any ‘settled external viewpoint,’ means that, ‘so far as real-life ongoing politics is concerned,’ postmodernists, along with de-constructivists, decolonialists and their ilk, tend to be ‘passively conservative in effect’ (Butler 2002, 61). If ‘decoloniality’ promotes a balkanisation of the Comparative Education field into identitybased cliques that prize ‘opacity,’ the risk is that in practice this will only serve to buttress the status quo.

### IR Good---Long

#### \*\*\*Note while prepping: the un-underlined part of this cites Henry Kissinger, who is not the most savory character. The neg may point this out. However, Ettinger (in my opinion) isn’t endorsing Kissinger, just quoting him to say that IR education matters, so if evil war criminals think IR research is important, that's a reason we should learn how it works!

#### Researching and debating IR teaches critical inquiry that spills out beyond the classroom—it’s not inevitably elitist or Eurocentric.

Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)

The first benefit is generating a well-trained pipeline of future IR scholars and practitioners. Today’s students are the scholars and practitioners of tomorrow, and sparking curiosity in students, especially undergraduates, has the potential to rejuvenate the field from within. As Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 292–293) argue, IR scholars should “take a more direct interest in how world politics is explained to students in everyday schooling practices.” This is eminently sensible. International relations’ preoccupation with “the cult of research intensivity” (Nossal 2006, 737), and to a lesser extent political practice, misleads the professoriate into believing that the very people who sustain universities as institutions and who are the future of the discipline—student subscribers—can be ignored. It has also led the IR professoriate to undervalue the contribution that the taught discipline makes to disciplinary renewal through the training of international relations’ next generation.

For future practitioners, whether in government or elsewhere, an IR education provides the conceptual architecture needed to make decisions about policy and its place in the world. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasizes this point: “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect” (as quoted in Desch 2019, 153). While Kissinger is talking about the highest level of elected office, it is equally true that policymakers throughout government come in equipped with the intellectual capital and technical skills learned in the classroom (Biswas and Paczynska 2015). For future scholars, early lessons have downstream effects on the very content of IR knowledge. After all, the classroom is where IR theory gets reproduced “for the first time” to future generations of IR scholars. As Newsom (1995, 64–65) put it, “[t]eachers plant the seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world’s most lasting contribution.” It is also a place where the durability and centrality of the field’s major theories are reinforced as a matter of course and not necessarily for the better (Vitalis 2015, 6). Early undergraduates carry the assumptions they are taught throughout their undergraduate and graduate careers, and beyond. A discipline that cannot connect with students or is inward-looking and esoteric risks putting off its next generation. Thus, the classroom needs to be treated with greater regard as a site of knowledge production and dissemination in the intellectual life of the field. In this sense, curiosity can be provoked among students that may continue beyond an undergraduate career. Take, for example, the observation of one student on her intellectual awakening in the classroom:

Despite a Eurocentric and male-dominated ethos, what ultimately convinced me to stay in IR was my exposure and inability to detach from what was first described to me as the politics of the “postcolonial.” A lecturer holding up a roughened paperback copy of Edward Said’s 1979 acclaimed work Orientalism originally introduced me to postcolonialism…Hearing Said’s words being reiterated back to me in my predominately white and conservative-leaning lecture theater was a defining moment in my education. Orientalism provided an experience that I could finally connect with: one where political power was not about who had the most weaponry or democracy, but instead about who held political control over the reality of the racialized person (Abu-Bakare 2017).

The moment captured in this tableau is the intellectual awakening that is possible when pedagogy is carefully considered. From the student perspective, well-taught courses prepare them better for the next stage in their education, starting with superior foundational training at the early undergraduate levels and progressing to improved research capabilities and substantive knowledge at the higher undergraduate levels, and then to advanced skills training in graduate school. Well-trained cohorts coming up the ranks will be highly proficient in a wider range of IR topics, theories, ideas, and methods and will be well prepared to make the jump to fluency. Similarly, future practitioners will be equipped with superior substantive and technical training. This is especially true with “experiential learning.” Done in purposeful ways, learning through experiences outside the classroom generates employable skills for students.

Social and Institutional Context of Teaching and Disciplinary Reproduction

Directly related to the question of the future of international relations is the social context of teaching and the discipline’s reproduction in the classroom. IR scholars must recognize that the IR classroom is the site of ideational preferences, clashes of favored or disfavored paradigms, of personal authority, generational difference, social privileges, and prejudices. At every point in professional international relations, there are implications for how knowledge is produced, taught, and passed on (Ettinger 2016; Colgan 2017; Fattore 2018; Knight 2019). Indeed, the intellectual output of IR scholars does not exist independent of the lived context in which it is produced. Gaining insight into the social context of international relations’ taught discipline can help begin to correct the pathologies that are affecting the way the next generation of IR scholars are being taught right now and how future scholars and practitioners will be taught next year and beyond.

It begins by addressing the social identity of the instructor and how it contributes to the reproduction of IR knowledge. After all, the instructor does not speak from a position of nowhere and an account of IR pedagogy should address the personal features of the instructor, her place within the discipline’s division of labor, and its effect on the delivery of course content (Biswas and Deylami 2017). For international relations especially, it is the site of entrenched male and Euro-Atlantic dominance with cascading implications within the classroom and beyond. The 2014 TRIP survey shows that the global IR professorate is two-thirds male (Maliniak et al. 2014). In the United States and British IR “core” and in the Anglo “noncore” (Cox and Nossal 2009), the professoriate is overwhelmingly white and male. Australia is 72.11 percent male and 76.87 percent white. Canada is 70.83 percent male and 83.4 percent white. The United Kingdom is 64.83 percent male and 85.23 percent white, while the United States is 68.33 percent male and 85.21 percent white non-Hispanic. New Zealand, a slight outlier, is 81.82 percent male but only 34.78 percent identifying as NZ European (Maliniak et al. 2014). Given what has been shown about the American dominance of the discipline, the insularity of national IR communities, and the gender gap in citations, it is reasonable to conclude that the bulk of the most influential IR scholarship is produced and disseminated by white men in the West (Maliniak et al. 2018; Maliniak et al 2013).

Understanding this relationship can improve IR pedagogy by recognizing how diverse student populations interact with an overwhelmingly white Euro-Atlantic intellectual tradition and by remedying some of the attending limitations such as geohistorical narrowness, state-centrism, epistemological positivism, and phallocentric authorship (Fonseca 2019). In this regard, the taught discipline of international relations should be intellectually responsive to a diversifying discipline and to a diversifying student population. Such circumstances call for a broader approach to teaching courses in a field whose heavy Euro-American centrality can alienate students when their backgrounds are not reflected in the course material. This is not simply a matter of curriculum design that tries to mirror or “look like” the students (Appiah 2019, SR7). Rather, it is one that balances disciplinary foundations with broadened ontological scope of what “matters” in IR in order to generate betterinformed teaching. It is widely recognized that international relations is a very traditional field of scholarship, but this should not preclude perspectives beyond the canon or case studies from outside the empirical mainstream. More ambitious and, especially, diverse content helps adapt teaching to changing student audiences. This is especially true at the undergraduate level. What is important to avoid is the “pipeline problem” that has discouraged women and minorities from progressing through the scholarly ranks in STEM fields (Brown et al. 2016; Branch 2016). By the same token, bringing more and more diverse young students into the discipline of international relations and encouraging their growth can bear intellectual fruit down the line. At very least, we avoid artificially restricting the development of the next generation of scholars.

By no means is this a call to jettison the classics. To the contrary, the field’s canon is irreplaceable as a foundation, as the intellectual inheritance of the present, as the prevailing ideas of foreign policymakers, and as points of disagreement for critical traditions. However, the scope of IR pedagogy can be expanded to make it relevant for a twenty-first century classroom. Primarily, this means expanding the theoretical and empirical scope of international relations beyond its traditional Eurocentric and male-dominated parameters (Acharya 2016). This is discussed below. Granted, there will be no singular population to which an IR curriculum will be pitched. Variation in student population profiles based on race, gender, class, geography, and other identity markers complicate the decisions that an instructor has to make. The point is that there are intellectual gains to be had when the taught discipline takes seriously the social context of international relations’ disciplinary reproduction. With a more diverse pedagogy in place, it is possible that, with more eyes on the subject matter and more minds from different backgrounds at work, the IR classroom can generate greater interest in fundamental theoretical questions for the next generation of scholars to solve.

Institutional context of teaching matters too. The vast majority of IR practice takes place in university institutions. Therefore, the material institutional setting must enter in as a condition of international relations’ intellectual life. Consider first, the matter of basic institutional survival. In an era where public universities around the world face funding problems, there are immediate economic imperatives for taking the taught discipline of international relations seriously. In the short term, survival in unforgiving economic times requires student enrollment and retention (Conley 2019). Systematic accounts of US undergraduate enrollment since the Great Recession of 2008 show majors in the “traditional disciplines” declining by 21 percent (philosophy) to 30 percent (history). Political science and international relations fare less badly, declining “only” by 11 percent and 15 percent over ten years (Schmidt 2018). Put differently, the classroom is on the front line in the battle for resources. Student recruitment and retention are essential to the economic viability of academic departments including political science and international relations. Turning students off the subject matter through an unreflexive pedagogy, boring classes, or mediocre lecturers has real economic implications for the future. Without students prepared to part with tuition dollars, or governments prepared to unlock activity-based funding, no department can thrive, even with a roster of productive researchers. Concretely, this means no new hiring and reduced budgets— a recipe for contraction. In this context, the systematic neglect of the classroom by IR stocktakers is entirely inexplicable given the parlous financial state of most public universities. Trends in expanded enrollment compound or create new problems. Universities that pack classrooms with hundreds, if not thousands, of more students—many of whom are international and pay exorbitant tuition fees—put revenue generation above pedagogy (Schulmann 2019).

The disciplinary division of university labor must be factored into an understanding of the context of IR teaching and its implications for the intellectual life of international relations. In this sense, debate about the taught discipline must grapple with question of resources, division of university labor, teaching assignments, pressures of the tenure track, the precarity of contract faculty, and other aspects of university governance as conditions that influence the classroom. One of the most striking trends in university governance is the increasing role of contingent instructors. In the United States, some 73 percent of instructional positions were nontenure track in 2016 (AAUP 2018). This is consistent with longer-term trends. The percentage of postsecondary instructional positions filled by contingent faculty increased from 57.6 percent in 1995 to 71.6 percent in 2011. In that time, the number of full-time tenure-track positions increased by 10 percent while the number of full- or part-time contingent positions doubled (GAO 2017, 8–9). This is not to say that contingent faculty are worse teachers, but the contingent nature of the work creates impediments to teaching. Fewer institutional resources, the constant need to reapply for jobs, and the need for part-time work outside the university are all matters that detract from time dedicated to students, improving pedagogy, or learning new content. Downstream, the design of an IR class or the delivery of an IR curriculum may not be nearly as effective as it could be.

Intellectual Reflection and Renewal from the Inside Out

Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.

This kind of renewal turns on the “eureka” moment when research ideas flows directly from classroom activities. A more systematic approach to renewal that is less reliant on serendipity begins by asking discipline-wide questions. The first is this: what is the purpose of teaching international relations? It is a variation on a core concern to the discipline and one that remains unresolved (Dyvik, Wilkinson, and Selby 2017)? Is it for disciplinary self-reproduction, to train future practitioners, or more broadly, citizens and knowledge workers in the twenty-first century economy (Darling and Foster 2012; Szarejko and Carnes 2018; Zartner et al. 2018)? Arriving at an official “purpose” for international relations is probably pointless, and it is best left to the decentralized community of scholars to decide. IR scholars have debated this question widely within the published discipline but far less so in the taught discipline. This is a shame because the answers matter for the nature of the design of individual courses and entire degree programs.

Just like the published discipline, the taught discipline is radically decentralized in universities around the world, subnational variations, department-level programs, and individual scholar’s preferences. Thus, it is incumbent on individual professors to give an answer in their own teaching programs. At the individual level, answering the question about the purpose of teaching international relations should outfit students with an answer to what they are about to encounter and why this topic, course, or degree program is worth pursuing. Students, especially early undergraduate students, need to know why they are about to be presented with the complicated theory and obscure events that are core (or peripheral) to the IR discipline. Answers are generously supplied in the introduction chapters to IR textbooks but the suite of options betrays a lack of focus that is symptomatic of the wider field (Albert 2010). However, this permissive intellectual environment is beneficial for wide-ranging intellectual pursuits, teaching styles, and pedagogical agendas. It may, though, come at the cost. The institutional underpinnings of the discipline—faculty administrators, editorial boards, funding agencies, hiring committees, and so on— may end up doing as much to shape the boundaries of the discipline as the substantive output (Albert and Buzan 2017, 908). The alternative, though, is subjecting intellectual and academic freedom to an institutionalized orthodoxy. In teaching, decentralization may be intellectually permissive but may come at the expense of disciplinary coherence.

This concern, though, may be overstated. TRIP data on curriculum design gives an indication of the competing and sometimes overlapping pedagogical priorities among the IR professoriate. In a question on introduction to IR classes, respondents were asked whether their introductory courses are designed more to introduce IR scholarship within the discipline or to prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and international issues. The result favors a mix of both with 80.83 percent incorporating scholarship and issues in some balance. The remaining 19.17 percent come down in favor of one to the exclusion of the other. At the master’s level, the ratio is a bit narrower (73 to 27 percent) but still overwhelmingly embraces a mixture of academic scholarship and international issues (Maliniak et al. 2014). Respondents are a bit more divided on what undergraduate courses should be mandatory in an IR program. They overwhelmingly agree (73.25 percent) that IR theory should be a required subject. However, they differ on other options. The next most popular candidates for a required course are international/global political economy (45.37 percent), international security (38.87 percent), and research methods (35.22 percent), followed by international organizations (27.59 percent), comparative foreign policy (22.86 percent), home country foreign policy (19.95 percent), international law (19.85 percent), diplomatic history (19.11 percent), and international economics (15.17 percent) (Maliniak et al. 2014). The point is that resolving what IR teaching is supposed to accomplish is hardly settled, but there is some convergence on certain issues.

So, what then, is the purpose of teaching international relations? Ultimately, it is up to the individual instructor to answer and to enact a program accordingly. But it is up to the community of scholars to debate. It may well be that the enormous variation in the purpose of teaching international relations and the radical decentralization is an inescapable feature of the taught discipline. Though IR teaching may be wildly divergent around the world, there is always some purpose to it, and, however defined, this is an intrinsic feature of an international relations education. Here, Cox’s (1981, 128) famous admonition that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” serves as the anchor concept for such pedagogical framing. It frames IR theories as political things and not just abstractions to be memorized or an analytical template to be applied uncritically. Similarly, it helps to frame thematic and empirical cases in the classroom so that course material is not merely a reflection the professor’s unexamined preference. In the classroom, it is up to the professor to articulate. Beyond the classroom in administrative meetings, academic conferences, and in print, it is up to the field to debate.

The next question asks what is the proper scope of IR teaching? This question has also been asked before of the field but not directly about the IR classroom (Albert and Buzan 2017, 898). The answer to this question connects different themes of this article: intellectual rejuvenation and disciplinary renewal, diversity, and the future of international relations as an intellectual project. In substance and in design, the scope of IR teaching should embrace pluralism in paradigm, empirical remit, and criticism. A great deal has been made of pluralism in international relations (Levine and McCourt 2018; Eun 2016), but pluralism in the taught discipline is far different from pluralism in the published discipline, where differences accrue over the merits of accumulation and diversity. Here, the scope of possibility in the classroom is far more intellectually permissive. Teaching international relations can be theoretically and empirically promiscuous. It can respect the canon, its inner logic, and its external life, as well as contemporary alternatives (Ferguson 2015). This is an “integrative pluralism” (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416) that embraces diversity as a means of “providing more comprehensive and multidimensional accounts of complex phenomena” and a pedagogical engagement with the world that includes, but hardly limited to the Euro-Atlantic theater, that has dominated generations of IR thinking (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416).

Pedagogical pluralism in international relations flows from intuitions about balancing theory and empirics, the canon and its alternatives, being current while eschewing presentism, being “useful” without being instrumentalist, and drawing on instructor expertise without being constrained by the hyperspecialized knowledge attendant to the published discipline. Of course, this is easy to say. But operationalizing these intuitions into a pluralistic teaching program is much more difficult. Complicating the matter is the relative absence of explicit theoretical guidance for making IR pluralism work in the classroom. The insights of proponents of a “Global IR” can help, including some critiqued above for their neglect of the classroom. In particular, Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 300–308) program for developing a Global IR provides concrete steps toward curriculum design as much as is does for research.

Regarding the IR theoretical parts of their program, Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) say that Global IR respects existing theories while “giving due recognition to the places, roles, and contributions of non-Western peoples and societies,” which entails “pluralization within theories, rather than just between them.” There are issues here. First, pluralization between theories requires expanding the remit of IR theory beyond the grand IR paradigms to include non-Western contributions to international thought (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Acharya 2011). But this is not easy. Tickner and Wæver (2009) make it clear that Anglo-American IR looms impossibly large around the world. Without jettisoning this intellectual inheritance, Thinking International Relations Differently (Tickner and Blaney 2012) provides a route to pluralism. That volume interrogates alternative meanings to some of international relations’ central concepts—security, state, sovereignty and authority, globalization, secularism, religion, and the international. A professor committed to this kind of pluralism can expand the conceptual vocabulary of international relations in a way that encourages undergraduate conversancy in multiple IR vernaculars within and beyond the Anglo-American core.

There is also the matter of what do with the existing, Western-centric canon. Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) also say that a global international relations would subsume rather than supplant existing IR theories and methods. The purpose here is not to displace Western-dominated IR knowledge but to situate it within the global context. This is an entirely attainable objective for an IR theory instructor. IR teachers should have full command of some IR theories while being conversant in nearly all anyway. Integrating a fuller slate of intellectual content into teaching IR theory permits a cognitive pluralism that is rarely available in the published discipline. The point here is that teaching narrowly and to the expertise of professors may suit their interests, but it puts blinders on the students. Upper-year and graduate studies can explore specific pathways, but only after international relations’ map has been presented. This likely means instructors must venture out of their preferred intellectual comfort zones and teach to their weaknesses as well as their strengths. Doing so, however, requires breaking through disciplinary walls and should not be underestimated. It requires breadth of knowledge, disciplinary literacy beyond the scholar’s training, and language skills (usually beyond English) that can take many years to develop, while the imperatives of the published discipline stress specialization.

Regarding the empirical subject matter, a pluralistic IR agenda would ground its empirics in world history rather than just Western history (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 301) This is demanding on an instructor whose subject-matter expertise will be narrow (by dint of academic training) and whose time will be short given other professional and personal commitments. Without considerable effort, this is more of an ideal than a reality. But a good start would be to follow Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 303) admonition to integrate the study of regions, regionalism, and area studies into the curriculum. In particular, this means offering case studies, examples, and illustrations drawn from parts of the world outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. To this we can add Buzan and Lawson’s (2015) case for expanding the temporal remit of international relations to the nineteenth century. This would break free of the apocryphal founding myths (Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011) and temporal myopia of the orthodox discipline (Buzan and Lawson 2014) in order to draw upon a richer and more global context for the emergence of the modern world. A worldly curriculum will likely begin rather thin, but over time become much deeper and more inclusive. Perhaps more attainable in the short-term is a pluralistic pedagogy that recognizes multiple forms of agency beyond the state and material power. Such an approach would entail a pedagogy addressing a diverse constellation of actors in world politics that offers a faithful representation of an overwhelmingly complex environment without reducing it exclusively to a handful of Western powers.

### IR Good---Short

#### Researching and debating IR teaches critical inquiry that spills out beyond the classroom—it’s not inevitably colonial.

Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)

Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.

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### Integrative Pluralism

#### Judge the debate through a lens of integrative pluralism—putting theories into conversation through evidence comparison and the burden of rejoinder opens space for marginalized perspectives. Centering debate on the explanatory power of competing worldviews reinforces academic exclusion.

Wight, 19—Professor and Chair of Government and International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, Australia (Colin, “Bringing the outside in: The limits of theoretical fragmentation and pluralism in IR theory,” Politics, Vol 39, Issue 1, 2019, dml)

Pluralism for the sake of pluralism seems to lead to an incapacitating relativism, or what Yosef Lapid (2003) calls a ‘flabby pluralism’. A better term might be disengaged pluralism. No claim or viewpoint would seem to be invalid, and theorists are free to pursue their own agenda with little or no contact with alternative views. This is a disengaged pluralism because there is no attempt to specify the relationships between theories or to examine one’s own theoretical position in the light of alternative views. The absence of an agreed unity of method would also entail that the standards by which the various theories are to be judged would be internal to the theory (Jackson, 2011; Smith, 2004). This would be a disengaged form of pluralism with each theoretical perspective legitimating its claims solely on its own terms and with little reason to engage in conversations with alternative approaches. It is the kind of pluralism that finds its political expression in apartheid. Despite the intense theoretical debate that followed the ‘third debate’ (Waever’s ‘fourth’), IR now seems to have settled into an uneasy truce based on theoretical pluralism/fragmentation. Indeed, in some respects, the validity of the ‘ism’s’ themselves have been called into question (Lake, 2013). Analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010) now seems to be the mantra of the day. The question remains as to whether we simply embrace this fragmentation or attempt to work towards a more coherent view of global processes. My own view is that we should attempt to move towards a position that I will term ‘integrative pluralism’ (Mitchell, 2003). Integrative pluralism is not an attempt to forge competing knowledge claims into one overarching position that subsumes them all. It is not a form of theoretical synthesis (Kratochwil, 2003), nor is it a middle ground that eclectically claims to take the best of various theories to forge them into a ‘grand theory of everything’ (Wendt, 1999). Integrative pluralism accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multi-dimensional accounts of complex phenomena. This is not a suggestion that a summation of the various theoretical claims will produce a complete account; we could not know when any account was complete. Moreover, engaging in integrative pluralism carries risks, and some theories may not survive. In the course engagement, some theories may ultimately be rejected, and others may undergo substantial change and modification; hence, it is not a form of relativism. Which theories contribute to our overall stock of knowledge and which fall by the wayside, however, is not an issue that can be resolved solely in the heat of metatheoretical debate. The ultimate test of integrative pluralism will be practice, but this is a practice that cannot even begin unless we have some sense of its problems, possibilities and practicality. Current theoretical debate in the discipline does not seem conducive to this discussion and theories seem to function as identity markers within a social system suffused by battles over resources and power. Understanding the different forms of pluralism is essential in terms of opening up space for global voices to enter the IR conversation. If mainstream, mainly Western, dominated IR theory struggles to listen to alternative voices from within its own limited inter-paradigmatic frameworks, then there is little chance that it will be open to non-western voices. In addition, if non-western global voices enter the terrain on the terms already set by the fragmentation of the ‘isms’ then opportunities for serious dialogue will be limited. Given the potential for non-western voices to reconfigure IR theory along new and interesting lines, it would be a disaster if those voices adopted the frameworks that have stymied serious cross theoretical debate thus far. Indeed, the current theoretical landscape that confronts new entrants to the discipline might be one factor that increases their exclusion. Those global voices will have a greater potential of not repeating the mistakes of the past if they have a sophisticated understanding of the structural configuration that has produced ‘isms inertia’. Getting around the current theoretical impasse will require an explanation of how it arises and an account of the limits, problems and potentials of theorising in IR. I suggest four main factors help explain theoretical fragmentation in the discipline. First is ontology. The contemporary international political system is best understood as a complex open system, which displays ‘emergent properties’ and degrees of ‘organised complexity’. Because all human systems have this form, they require a plurality of explanations to deal with phenomena at differing levels, and the complex differentiation of causal mechanisms within levels. Since theory is a process of abstraction, and since we cannot isolate particular mechanism in the manner of some of the natural sciences, then some form of theoretical pluralism is necessary and to be expected. Yet some of the natural sciences face a similar situation and have not regressed into a state of rampant theoretical fragmentation. So, complexity is not a sufficient explanation. Second, is the academic division of labour, which compartmentalises knowledge into zones of expertise, which in turn, structurally impedes the development of interdisciplinary research needed to explain complex systems. Third, is the structure of IR as an academic discipline, which using a framework developed by Richard Whitley (1984), I characterise as a ‘fragmented adhocracy’. Whitley views reputation as the currency of an academic discipline. A fragmented adhocracy is marked by a low degree of reputational interdependency between competing research groups, with few organisational impediments regarding the choice of theoretical framework, research methodology or even core problematic. As a consequence, the research activity within the field proceeds in an arbitrary, incoherent and at times ad hoc manner, with few sustained attempts to integrate new research with the existing configuration of knowledge. In such an intellectual structure, the potential for integrative pluralism is low. The fourth reason, however, is the most important, the most problematic, and I suspect the most difficult to change. This is the issue of epistemology, and in particular disciplinary accounts of its place in the practice of science. My argument here is simple: The way IR currently understands the issue of epistemology, is confused, incorrect and a severe barrier to serious debate across differing theoretical perspectives. I refer here to the widespread view that positivism, postpositivism, rationalism, constructivism, feminism and postmodernism, for example, are epistemological positions. For instance, according to Markus Kornprobst: The deepest and most consequential disagreements in the field are epistemological. Both the so-called ‘third debate’ (Lapid, 1989) between positivists and postpositivists and the ‘communicative stasis’ (Lapid, 2003: 130) that has succeeded it, speak volumes about the divisiveness of assumptions on how to produce knowledge. (Kornprobst, 2009: 87) And for Steve Smith: the key difference between rationalist and reflectivist approaches is that, broadly speaking, rationalist accounts are positivist, whereas reflectivist approaches oppose positivism … for now it is enough to note that the central differences between rationalist and reflectivist accounts are epistemological and methodological, and only secondarily about what the world is like (ontology). (Smith, 2010: 5) This account treats the debate between positivists and postpositivists as a debate between competing epistemologies. This is an error; positivism is not an epistemology but a philosophy of science. Moreover, the idea of a ‘feminist’ epistemology or a postmodern epistemology makes no sense. At best we might talk about feminist methods or postmodern methods. However, to ask of a positivist for example, ‘how do you know X’, and to receive the reply ‘because of positivism’ is not an epistemological position it is a statement of identity. As John Gunnell (1998: 7), argues ‘epistemology, properly construed, is I will maintain a post-hot enterprise contingent on substantive theory and scientific practice’. Yet rarely, if ever, are we told why the differences between positivism and postpositivism are legitimately treated in epistemological terms? Never is it explained why epistemologies cannot be integrated and/or combined; apart that is, from vague allusions to incommensurability (Wight, 1996). This is to misuse and abuse the term epistemology. It is a misuse and abuse of the term because epistemological positions do not operate as the a priori discontinuous and discrete entities this view suggests. I take it as given that the argument about complexity is a given. Likewise, the adverse effects of the academic division of labour in terms of impeding interdisciplinary work are not in doubt. Hence, the article will concentrate on the relationship between current understandings of epistemology and the structure of IR as an academic discipline. These two aspects are mutually reinforcing. Current understandings of epistemology in IR reproduce the disciplinary social structure, and the disciplinary structure reproduces the current understanding of epistemology. Before proceeding, however, a clarification on the issue of science. My position is based on what is known as scientific realism (Psillos, 1999). According to scientific realism, there is no such thing as the scientific method that can be applied in all domains and across all subject matters. Science is not one thing it is many. There is no one scientific method, and each science needs to orientate its methods according to the specifics of its object domain. How we study sub-atomic particles will require different methods to how we study human societies. For the sake of expediency, I will merely define science as the attempt to come to understand and/or explain the chosen object domain through systematic and critical inquiry.

### No Prior Questions/Root Cause

#### Sweeping theories can’t explain policy decisions—if they can, then our framework link turns their offense.

Rose, 21—editor of Foreign Affairs (Gideon, “Foreign Policy for Pragmatists,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021, dml)

Theories of history, fundamental beliefs about how the world works, are usually assumed rather than argued and rarely get subjected to serious scrutiny. Yet these general ideas set the parameters for all the specific policy choices an administration makes. Know an administration’s theory of history, and much of the rest is easy to fill in.

There are a lot of possible theories of history, but they tend to fall, like Bush’s and Trump’s, into two main camps: optimistic and pessimistic. Thus, the Clinton administration followed its own version of happy directionality—think of it as Bush with less muscular Christianity. And there have been earlier believers in Trump’s dark and stormy night, as well.

Unfortunately, given the stakes of the question, no one really knows whether the optimists or the pessimists have the better case. Political theorists have fought about that for centuries, with neither side winning. A few generations ago, modern social scientists joined in, generating and testing lots of theories in lots of ways, but still, neither camp bested the other. And then, in the last few years, history got interesting again and erased some of the few things the scholars thought they had learned.

As individuals, presidents have had strong views on these matters. As a group, they have not. American foreign policy is notorious for its internal tensions. Its fits and starts and reversals do not fit easily into any single theoretical framework. Yet this pluralism has proved to be a feature, not a bug. Precisely because it has not embraced any one approach to foreign policy consistently, Washington has managed to avoid the worst aspects of all. Blessed with geopolitical privilege, it has slowly stumbled forward, moving over the centuries from peripheral obscurity to global hegemony. Its genius has been less strategic insight than an ability to cut losses.

By now, it seems fair to say that the debate between the optimists and the pessimists will never be settled conclusively, since each perspective knows something big about international politics. Instead of choosing between them, the new administration should keep both truths in its pocket, taking each out as appropriate.

Learning in U.S. foreign policy has come largely across administrations. President Joe Biden’s goal should be to speed up the process, allowing it to happen within an administration. Call it the Bayesian Doctrine: rather than being wedded to its priors, the administration should constantly update them.

The way to do so is to make theorists, not principals, the administration’s true team of rivals, forcing them to make real-world predictions, and to offer testable practical advice, and then seeing whose turn out to be better in real time. In this approach, searching intellectual honesty is more important than ideology; what people think matters less than whether they can change their minds. Constantly calculating implied odds won’t always win pots. But it will help the administration fold bad hands early, increasing its winnings over time.

### Rejecting IR Fails

#### Rejecting IR scholarship as praxis creates openings for far-right cooption. There is no single disciplinary impulse within IR.

Michelsen, 21—Department of War Studies, School of Security, King’s College London (Nicholas, “What is a minor international theory? On the limits of ‘Critical International Relations’,” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol 17, Issue 3, 2021, dml)

The problem of synthesis stalks all self-defining Critical approaches to IR. Defining the terms of reference for intellectual dissidence in relation to IR’s ‘disciplinary crisis’, as the poststructuralists did in viewing critique as a function of disciplinary marginality, created conditions ripe for viewing any competitor theory as problematic to the degree that they can be deemed insufficiently minor (Whitehall, 2016). The idea that critique necessitates moving ‘beyond IR’ as an inherently majoritarian project has become a widely expressed trope. The result is that Critical IR theorists now engage in increasingly virulent disagreements over the political and ethical implications of disciplinarity itself. In perpetual abeyance, claimants to Critical IR become hostages to a continuous risk of being exposed as insufficiently pure of the (modernist, racist, colonial, patriarchal, heteronormative, positivist, capitalist) traces of ‘the major literature/discipline’. At the same time, Critical IR scholars who advocate for a disciplinary exit in search of ‘more Critical’ inter-disciplines have found themselves wrestling with the charge of pre-judgement: Since they appear to know what ‘Being Critical’ will look like after de-disciplinarisation, critique takes the form of testing whether other scholars meet these pre-given criteria (Holden, 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020).

This stream in contemporary IR scholarship ignores the manners in which minor theories, far from tending towards alliances, are often set to contradictory political and ethical purposes. And that the visions of world politics created by scholars ‘moving beyond’ disciplinary IR can be just as problematic as visions already settled within the discipline. Contemporary political and social movements borrow intellectual resources from various (once or still) minor theoretical traditions in IR to think against a ‘Globalist’ world order, incorporating the Gramscian position that ‘politics is downstream from culture’, the ideal of a transgressive emancipatory identity, and the critique of neo-colonialism (Love, 2017; Nagle 2017). The philosopher Alain De Benoist wrote his manifesto for the New Right in the year 2000 with the aim of challenging the oppressive implications of major international theories, especially Liberalism, borrowing widely from resources of minor intellectual critique (de Benoist and Champetier, 1999). This theory is marginal in disciplinary IR, but influential amongst populist politicians like Putin, Trump, Orban, Salvini and Le Pen, as well as online communities of Race Realists, western chauvinists, and white nationalists. It proposes that Liberalism destroys the autonomy of ethnicities and cultures, and that the history of the west has been one of ongoing cultural as well as political colonialism. De Benoist’s argument is that the project of decolonisation is incomplete, and continues through international aid and UN-led Liberal paternalism.

The answer proposed by the New Right is to restore a truly independent status to diverse cultures and indigenous world-views in International Relations, and suggest that people belonging to these ‘birth-cultures’ must actively work towards their national and cognitive emancipation from all the baggage of Liberal modernity, if necessary, through violently closing borders. The New Right claims its intellectual marginality vis-à-vis Liberalism or Globalism (understood as the ideological representative of modernism in international thought) is a marker of its virtue. The New Right is not, however, widely viewed as a ‘Critical ally’ of Decolonial IR theory.

A claim to minor theoretical status is also visible amongst reactionary theorists of gender, including online groups of men’s rights activists, western chauvinist militias like the Proud Boys, or traditionalist ‘family values’ movements (Nagle, 2017). These groups develop an operative concept of the radical intellectual margins as central to their understandings of critique, and of the emancipatory relationship which their critique has to hegemonic theoretical frameworks that they perceive as oppressing them: Liberalism or ‘Cultural Marxism’ (Nagle, 2017). These actors see their critiques of what they term ‘gender ideology’ as part of a necessary escape from the straightjacket of modernist categories, currently hegemonic in contemporary academia. In other words, the belief that transgressive or marginal theory is emancipatory has diverse advocates, whose antimodernism or anti-hegemonism comes with divergent attitudes to gender, race, culture, economics, social, political and international organisation.

The sociological implications of this point were anticipated, but not fully developed, by Katz (1996: 488), who noted that:

‘talk of exclusion can lead to an unsavory hierarchy of marginalization – a kind of competitive victimology – and even to the cul-de-sac of an essentialist identity politics. Notions of exclusion are all about, one might even say tautologically about, position, and if we are not careful they can lead to relativist accounts that offer little of practical value. And they can be disingenuous – proclamations of exclusion by scholars who are quite included’.

The historical moment facing critique calls us to recognise that minor theories infer no allied ethics or politics. There is no cohesive and abiding sovereign ‘logic of modernity’ that forms the superstructure of disciplinary IR, and gives assurance that the postdisciplinary avant-guard will share an understanding of virtue. The romanticism characteristic of self-describing Critical intellectual cultures that arose in IR in the immediate Post-Cold War context must now be reconsidered. Many of the same intellectual tools are now being effectively mobilised by reactionaries, racists and gender absolutists. Contemporary reactionaries have read their Deleuze, their Gramsci, their Derrida and Foucault (see Land, 2012), and they are cognisant of the discursive logic and rhetorical power of, for example, concepts of exclusion, identity, precarity, marginality, hegemony, the avant-guard, victimhood and indigeneity (see Michelsen and De Orellana, 2019).

The challenge facing scholars in IR who seek to write in the service of vulnerable groups, like migrants lacking a safe home state, those who do not fit with heteronormative gender roles, or the victims of racism, is that their reactionary theoretical interlocutors have recognised the power in claiming to be uniquely reflexive critics, intellectually marginal vis-à-vis dominant theoretical assumptions about IR. The category ‘Critical IR’ provides no tools by which to counter these relativistic arguments. In this context, the belief that ‘Being Critical’ requires a minoritarian exit from disciplinary IR may be a distraction from developing methodologically and epistemologically rigorous critiques, that can be communicated as such. Faith in the emancipatory intellectual margins brings to mind Latour’s (2004: 225) worry that self-describing ‘Critical’ scholars today are like ‘those mechanical toys that endlessly make the same gesture when everything else has changed around them’.